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SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS UNDER THE GERMIAN
STOCK CORPORATION LAW OF 1965
DON BERGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
ON January 1, 1966, a new Stock Corporation Law1 (Aktiengesetz)
became effective in West Germany. The reform movement culmi-
nating in the adoption of this statute demonstrated the existence of prob-
lems in German corporate law similar to those confronting American law.
Undoubtedly, the corporation has become one of the most powerful
forces in twentieth century economics.2 It is "both a method of property
tenure and a means of organizing economic life."3 The corporation's
separation of ownership into its component parts, control and beneficial
ownership,4 has brought into sharp focus the fundamental divergence
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. Law of Sept. 6, 1965, [1965] BGB1. I 1089, Aktiengesetz (C.H. Beck 1965) [hereinafter
cited as Ak-tG]. The Aktiengesetz has been published in a bilingual edition. See Aktiengesetz
1965: The German Stock Corporation Law (R. Mueller & E. Galbraith transl. 1966). The
Stock Corporation Law pertains only to the Aktiengesellschaft (AG), a form of business
association based on freely transferrable shares. The other widely used form of business
association in Germany is the Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung (GmbH). This
"limited liability company" is also based on share ownership but the shares are not freely
transferrable. See Vagts, Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the
German, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 33-34 (1966). See also Haskell, The American Close Corpora-
tion and Its West German Counterpart: A Comparative Study, 21 Ala. L. Rev. 287 (1969).
The GmbH, which bears dose analogy to the American close corporation, is the subject of
separate statutory regulation. Law of April 20, 1892, [1892] RGBL I 447. A movement to
reform the law governing limited liability companies has commenced. See, eg., A. Hueck,
Gedanken zur Reform des Aktienrechts und des GmbH-Rechts (1963); Goerdeler, Zur
Reform des Aktienrechts und des GmbH-Rechts, 1963 Juristische Rundschau 179.
2. In the United States, corporations have steadily increased in wealth and number.
While the increase in number is due mostly to the formation of closely-held corporations,
the increase in corporate wealth can be ascribed to the tremendous concentrations of property
in a small number of public corporations. This phenomenon can also be observed in
Germany where the number of Aktiengeselschaften has steadily decreased from a level of
approximately 17,000 in 1926 to only 2,332 in 1960, with the same trend continuing since
that time. Simultaneously, the number of limited liability companies has steadily increased,
reaching 35,430 in 1960. This does not indicate, however, any diminishing role of the stock
corporation in the German economy. Although its number has shrunk, the capital owned
and controlled by stock corporations has increased from a total of about 19 billion marks
in 1926 to over 30.4 billion marks in 1960. Between 1926 and 1961 the average capital per
corporation has increased from 1.1 million marks to 14.5 million marks. In both countries,
therefore, the economic impact of the corporate form of business organization has increased
in importance not merely because the total wealth controlled by it has increased, but also
because this wealth is concentrated in fewer hands. See A. Hueck, supra note 1, at 3-8.
3. A. Berie & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 3 (rev. ed. 1968).
4. Id. at 5-8.
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between shareholder and management interests. To protect each from
being overpowered by the other, limitations have had to be developed.
In the past, such limitations were based on the characterization of cor-
porations as artificial persons "who did not have.., souls or conscience,"
"had no morals,"5 and, therefore, were to be feared. The contemporary
problem is more delicate. To attract necessary capital, investors' interests
must be protected. In the small shareholder's case these interests include
his desire to receive dividends and to have some power of decision over
the corporation's activities. These interests necessarily conflict with those
of management, which encompass retaining a sufficient part of annual
profits for expansion, investment and other business purposes. Moreover,
management does not not welcome shareholder participation in the man-
agement function.
The development of American corporate law illustrates a balancing of
these conflicting interests to achieve a result harmonious with a public
policy of maximum protection for each without detriment to the economy.
No final solution, pleasing to all, has been reached. Perhaps, it is unat-
tainable. Yet, this evolution of respective spheres of action for manage-
ment and shareholders has been more satisfactory than the attempts to
find solutions to similar problems in the civil law system. It is the rela-
tively unsatisfactory treatment of shareholders, especially minority share-
holders, in German law which forms the subject of this inquiry.
A. The Legal Nature of the Shareholder's Interest in the Corporation
A corporation is a juristic person. It has a legal personality indepen-
dent of the persons who have created it. This separate legal personality
enables the corporation to perform the acts necessary to conduct business
by granting to it the legal capacity to assert its rights and allowing it to
incur legal liabilities. The personality not only shields the shareholder
from individual liability for corporate acts, but it also effectively separates
the shareholder-investor from his investment. He neither has direct own-
ership rights in the capital which he has invested in the corporation, nor
ownership of an interest proportionate to his investment in any corporate
property. These general statements apply equally to German law.0
American law views the shareholder's relationship to the corporation as
contractual. 7 The substantive content of the contract is found in the cor-
5. A. Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society 6 (1957). Such early restrictions
were: limitations on the amount of property which could be owned, incorporation for a
specific number of years only, enforcement of the ultra vires doctrine, and appointment of
court "auditors" to inspect corporation operations. Id. at S.
6. H. Wlirdinger, Aktien- und Konzernrecht 4-9 (2d ed. 1966).
7. Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N.E.2d 230 (1944).
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poration's articles of incorporation, bylaws, resolutions, and stock certifi-
cates, as well as in applicable statutory provisions.8 Title to all corporate
property vests in the corporation rather than in the shareholder,' who
merely has a contractual right to receive his proportionate share of cor-
porate property when it is distributed."0 Although the terminology differs
somewhat, the shareholder of a German corporation has essentially the
same limited interest. The corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) as a juristic
person with an independent legal personality, "owns" corporate property.
The shareholders have an interest in corporate property based on their
capital contribution, but this interest is limited to the right of proportion-
ate participation in distributions. The fact that, from an economic view-
point, shareholders collectively are regarded as the corporation's "own-
ers" does not alter the conclusion that the individual shareholder's rights
are not equivalent to "ownership" rights, i.e., rights to control and protect
the property as well as to assert damage claims."
The absence of shareholder "ownership" rights, however, does not
absolve management from the responsibility inherent in handling an-
other's property. In American law, the imposition of fiduciary duties on
the corporation seeks to prevent an abuse of the powers given to manage-
ment. German law, lacking the development of a separate system of
equity, attempts to protect shareholder interests through statutory pro-
visions. To a large extent, these provisions are remedial rather than
preventive. Since resort to legal process entails procedural and financial
burdens, the remedy may turn out to be more burdensome than the injury.
B. The Reform Movement in Germany
That "[t]he history of the stock corporation law is the history of its
reforms ...."" is indeed an apt description of the process of revision
which, for over a century, has sought to find that elusive balance among
the conflicting interests of corporation, management and shareholders in
Germany. The penultimate reform movement, reacting against excessive
power allocations to management, culminated in the enactment of the
1937 corporate statute.' The major objective then was to terminate the
8. Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Western Foundry Co. v.
Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722 (1949); United States Radiator Corp. v. State, 20S
N.Y. 144, 101 N.E. 783 (1913); Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 87 A.2d 227
(1952).
9. See Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).
10. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 208 (1920).
11. See E. Mestmfacker, Verwaltung, Konzerngewalt und Rechte der Aktion-are 7-20
(1958); 1 B. Schr~der, Deutscher Rechtsspiegel 680, 690-91 (3d ed. 1964); H. Wiirdinger,
supra note 6, at 5, 44-46.
12. Duden, Die Aktienrechtsreform, 3 Juristen-Jahrbuch 69 (1962).
13. Law of Jan. 30, 1937, [19371 RGBI. I 107 [hereinafter cited as AktG (1937)].
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abuse of voting rights by management and majority shareholders. The
statutorily unrestricted right of corporations to issue shares carrying more
than one vote each (Mehrstimmrechtsaktien)14 had been widely used to
give corporate control to shareholders having only a relatively small
financial investment in the corporation. Single shares that carried as many
as one thousand votes were not uncommon in the 1920's.15 In addition,
so-called "management shares" (Verwaltungsaktien), i.e., shares owned by
the corporation, were voted by management. 10 Although the 1937 statute
restricted these practices, 7 it did not strengthen shareholder interests in
other areas. In fact, management control over dividend policy was
strengthened to the point of excluding shareholders completely. 8 The
formulation of business policy, nominally the responsibility of the board
of managers, could be given to its chairman who could, if the articles of
incorporation did not provide otherwise, cast the deciding vote on all
matters regardless of the other board members' contrary votes. This so-
called Fiihrer-prinzip was a strong emotional factor in the recent reform
movement.
Dissatisfaction with the existing scope of shareholder rights and
remedies grew during the late 1950's when it became evident that cor-
porate expansion would have to find new sources of capital. To a large
extent, the post-war "economic miracle" in Germany was financed by
heavy corporate borrowing, an expensive source of capital. In addition, as
the Common Market's early success opened new possibilities for corpo-
rate expansion, the need to divert the small investor's funds from their
traditional destination, savings accounts and bonds, became ever greater.
The "popularization" of stock ownership, therefore, became one of the
slogans which the advocates of corporation law reform emphasized.
In 1958, the German Ministry of Justice released for public comment
the first draft of a new stock corporation law. 9 Later, in 1962, the Min-
istry submitted an official draft to the German legislature.2 0 The reform-
ers' intent to popularize share ownership was expressed in their attempt to
furnish greater protection to shareholder interests by achieving a closer
harmony between the provisions of the stock corporation law and the
14. See text accompanying note 208 infra.
15. See A. Hueck, Gesellschaftsrecht 109-10 (14th ed. 1968).
16. Id. at 110.
17. See text accompanying notes 208-14 infra.
18. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
19. See Beitrage zur Aktienrechtsreform (R. Hengeler ed. 1959).
20. Entwurf eines Aktiengesetzes, Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wablperiode, Drucksacho
IV/171, Feb. 3, 1962 [hereinafter cited as AktG Draft]. This draft, originally submitted
to the legislature in 1960, had to be reintroduced because no final action had been taken
by the end of the previous legislative session.
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basic principles of the German economic system. As the reformers stated
in the draft:
Our legal and economic order is based on the recognition and protection of private
property and the free disposition of private property ....
A corporation law which is in accord with these basic principles of our economic
order, must, therefore, be based on the recognition of the shareholders' economic
ownership of the enterprise resting on their capital investment, and may only limit
the shareholders' right of participation and control to such an extent as is necessary
to assure the corporation's ability to function and the realization of the purpose of
the union for which the shareholders voluntarily joined together, as well as to assure
the safeguarding of superior economic and socio-political goals.21
It should be noted that this language refers to the protection of share-
holders' rights rather than to shareholder rights themselves. This distinc-
tion, reflected concretely in the draft's substantive provisions, as well as
in the newly enacted statute, makes characterization of the reform law
as a Magna Carta for stockholders22 a rather undiscerning conclusion.
The reform law is primarily concerned with the strengthening of collec-
tive, rather than individual, shareholder rights."-
This article's purpose is to analyze the new statute's provisions with
respect to those rights which are of direct concern to most shareholders.
To make such an analysis understandable, a short description of the struc-
ture of and power allocation in the German stock corporation is essen-
tial.24
II. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Under the Aktiengesetz, power to manage the corporation is divided
among three institutions: the board of managers (Vorstand), the board of
supervisors (Aufsichtsrat), and the shareholders' meeting (Hauptver-
sam iaung).
A. The Board of Managers
The effective power to formulate corporate policy and to conduct cor-
porate business is vested in the board of managers,' an institutionalized
counterpart to the officers of the American corporation. The German
board, however, has far greater authority than its American counterpart.
21. Id. at 92-93 (author's translation).
22. Time, June 4, 1965, at 82.
23. R. Wieth~lter, Interessen und Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft im amerikanichen
and deutschen Recht 81 (1961); Gierke, Der Referentenentwurf eines deutschen Aktienge-
setzes, 122 Zeitschrift fr das gesamte Handelsrecht and Konkursrecht 7 (1959).
24. A more detailed description can be found in Steefel & von Falkenhausen, The New
German Stock Corporation Law, 52 Cornell L.Q. 518 (1967). See also Vagts, supra note 1.
25. AktG § 76(1).
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1. Appointment, Dismissal and Compensation
The managers are appointed by the board of supervisors for a max-
imum term of five years, after which they may be reappointed.20 It is
permissible to have only one manager for the corporation instead of a
whole board. If a board is appointed, a chairman may be selected
from among its members by the board of supervisors. He cannot, how-
ever, be elected by the managers themselves.28 Under the 1937 statute,
the so-called Fiihrer-prinzip allowed the chairman to cast the deciding
vote on all board matters. The new provision,29 however, provides for
board decisions by majority vote.
Managers may be dismissed by the board of supervisors for "im-
portant reasons," among which the statute expressly includes serious
violations of duty, and incompetence. 0 What other "important reasons"
may be is a factual issue determined under the circumstances of each
case. No provisions may be made either in the articles of incorporation
or in employment contracts to the effect that dismissal shall only occur
for specified reasons. 3 Prior case law indicated that where the share-
holders' meeting had adopted a resolution expressing lack of confidence
in a manager, the board of supervisors might regard such resolution as
sufficient reason to dismiss him, provided the "no confidence" vote was
legally valid. A mere arbitrary vote, one instigated for the sole pur-
pose of securing a manager's dismissal, or one contrary to "good
morals," therefore, did not constitute an "important reason" for
dismissal by the board of supervisors.32 For example, where a majority
shareholder used his voting power to withdraw confidence from a manager
who opposed some transaction or practice desired by that shareholder,
dismissal by the board of supervisors was not permissible merely on the
basis of the "lack of confidence" resolution.3 The new statute incorpo-
rates prior case law by classifying a lack of confidence vote as an impor-
tant reason for dismissal, unless the vote is arbitrary. 4
Compensation for managers may be in the form of a salary, a stated
percentage of net profits, 5 or both (as is the usual case). The total com-
pensation received by managers, including all fringe benefits, such as
26. AktG § 84(1).
27. AktG § 76(2).
28. AktG § 84(2).
29. AktG § 77(1).
30. AktG § 84(3).
31. Judgment of Jan. 28, 1953, 8 BGHZ 348, 360-61.
32. Judgment of April 28, 1954, 13 BGHZ 188.
33. See H. Wilrdinger, supra note 6, at 116.
34. AktG § 84(3).
35. AktG § 86(1).
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pension rights and insurance benefits, must be reasonably related to both
the tasks performed and the corporation's general financial condition.
Enforcement of this limitation rests with the board of supervisors which
can, if adverse business conditions cause a substantial decline in the
corporation's financial condition, reduce such compensation by an appro-
priate amount.36 However, this power applies only to compensation rights
of presently employed managers. A reduction of retired managers' pen-
sion rights, therefore, is not within the scope of this statutory provision
(such reductions may be permitted under Civil Code provisions" if pen-
sion payments constitute a burden jeopardizing the corporation's financial
status and are so excessively high compared to general economic condi-
tions in society as to be "unconscionable"). 8 Except for the fact that the
manager is entitled to submit his resignation, effective at the close of
the next calendar quarter, regardless of the period of employment re-
maining under his contract,39 no other terms of the employment con-
tract are affected by a reduction in compensation. Since the German
bankruptcy statute permits employees to recover damages for the full
contractual employment period4" where their employer goes through
bankruptcy proceedings, a manager could be entitled to as much as
five years damages for loss of compensation. However, this recovery is
regarded as excessive in the case of managers, and the stock corporation
law consequently limits such recovery to a maximum period of two
years .
41
Any natural person, except a member of the board of supervisors of
that corporation,42 may be a manager. Under the new law it is no longer
permissible to have a member of the board of managers of the parent
36. AktG § 87(1)-(2).
37. Blirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] §§ 157, 242 (C.H. Beck 1964).
38. Judgment of April 30, 1935, 148 RGZ 81. The employer is considered to be under
a duty to maintain pension payments, once commenced, even when no contractual obligation
exists or when he has expressly reserved the right to stop such payments at will. See 1
Soergel, Birgerliches Gesetzbuch § 242, Anm. E(3)(b)(11) (8th ed. 192). If the retired
employee has a contractual right to pension payments, its reduction because of the
employer's economic difficulties depends upon the application of contract principles of
frustration. The general principle of "WegfaU der Gesch.iftsgrundlage" (disappearance of
the foundation of the contract) is to the effect that the courts may change the contractual
obligation where the factual circumstances surrounding the transaction have changed to
such an extent that enforcement of the originally promised performance would violate
principles of "good faith." For an analysis of the doctrine and its historical development,
see Hay, Frustration and its Solution in German Law, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 345, 356-66
(1961). See also K. Larenz, Geschfaftsgrundlage und Vertragserf'lllung (3d ed. 1963).
39. AktG § 87(2).
40. Konkursordnung § 22, Law of Feb. 10, 1877, [18771 RGBI. I 355.
41. AktG § 87(3).
42. AktG § 105(1).
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corporation appointed to the board of supervisors of its subsidiary, while
having a manager of that subsidiary appointed to the parent corporation's
board of supervisors. This very common practice was one of the most
controversial points in the discussions pertaining to German corporate law
reform. Despite strong pressures from industry, the view regarding this
practice as violating conflict of interest principles prevailed. 43
2. The Standard of Conduct
Since the board of managers is solely responsible for the corporation's
conduct and activities, the board must operate the corporation with not
only the corporation's best interest in mind, but also with that of its
shareholders and employees. 4 In carrying out its duties, the board is held
to the standard of conduct of the "ordinary and prudent" businessman.
Failure to adhere to this standard results in liability to the corporation for
damages caused to it.4 Such liability may be joint or several. Conse-
quently, while the particular manager who acted irresponsibly may be
initially liable for all damages, other board members may incur liability
if their failure to notice the transaction or to intervene effectively is a
violation of their corporate duty.40 In a proceeding to recover damages for
wrongful acts, the managers bear the burden of proving adherence to the
requisite standard of conduct.4 7 The statute lists specific actions which are
regarded as per se violations of this standard. For example, managers are
liable for corporate damages when they, contrary to the stock company
law's provisions: give rebates to shareholders on the purchase price of
shares, pay illegal dividends, distribute corporate property without for-
mally declaring a dividend, pay debts and obligations (other than current
operating expenses) after the corporation becomes insolvent, grant pro-
hibited credits or issue bearer shares prior to receiving full payment
therefor.48
While the corporation cannot assert the managers' duty to compensate
it for damages where the transaction is based on a legally valid share-
holders' resolution, it can do so if the transaction is based on a board of
supervisors' resolution.
Corporate creditors who are unable to obtain satisfaction from the
corporation may, to the extent of their unsatisfied claims, enforce the
managers' obligation to the corporation for breach of duty. In such a
creditor proceeding neither a shareholders' nor a board of supervisors'
43. AktG § 100(2).
44. AktG § 76(1).
45. AktG § 93(1)-(2).
46. Judgment of Feb. 3, 1920, 98 RGZ 98.
47. AktG § 93(2).
48. AktG § 93(3).
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resolution authorizing the transaction will shield the managers from lia-
bility.49 Moreover, unless the transaction for which damages are sought
is one of the specific violations listed in the statute, the creditor must
establish a prima facie case of "gross violation" of the managers' stand-
dard of conduct. In any event, the burden of proving adherence to the
standard remains on the managers.
3. Functions
The board of managers carries out two separate statutory functions in
operating the corporation. Specifically, a distinction is made between
operation of the business (Geschldftsfiihrung) and representation of the
corporation (Vertretungsbefugnis).
Subject to the liability for damages already discussed, managers have
exclusive responsibility for the operation of the business. They are neither
bound by instructions from the shareholders' meeting, unless advice was
specifically requested,"0 nor can they delegate to the supervisors any tasks
which they are supposed to perform.51 However, sole responsibility for
the conduct of corporate business does not indicate an absence of any
restraint. This restraint is imposed in several ways. Specifically, the man-
agers' actions must conform to statutory provisions designed to assure the
maintenance of corporate assets. In addition, by statute, certain transac-
tions require express shareholder approval."2 The board is also bound by
limitations imposed on it in the articles of incorporation. Of these, the
principal limitation is the corporation's stated purpose, which denies in-
ternal validity to acts outside the scope of that purpose. The articles of
incorporation may also require the supervisors' approval for specific types
of transactions. 3
The power to represent the corporation involves the legal validity of the
managers' acts regarding third persons. While the board is again under
obligation to the corporation not to exceed the limitations imposed upon it
by the articles of incorporation or the board of supervisors, any transac-
tion exceeding such intra-corporate limitation binds the corporation and
results in a legal obligation to the third person."' This obligation exists
even where the transaction is in violation of the purpose clause of the
49. AkG § 93(4)-(5).
50. AktG § 119(2).
51. AktG § 111(4).
52. These include giving creditors promissory notes entitling them to issuance of shares
(Wandelschuldverschreibungen) or tying debt payments to the decaration of shareholder
dividends (Gewinnschuldverschreibungen), AktG § 221; profit-sharing agreements, AktG
§ 293; corporate mergers, AktG § 340; see AktG § 119(1).
53. AktG § 111(4).
54. AktG § 82(1)-(2).
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articles of incorporation"' or where the third person dealing with the
board had actual notice of the limitation being transgressed."0 Depending
upon the factual circumstances, however, a third person having such
actual notice may be left with an unenforceable claim if its enforcement
through judicial process would be contrary to good morals.57 Contrasted
with the binding effect of these transactions are managerial transactions
which violate statutory restrictions. Such statutory violations will not
result in corporate liability toward third persons.58 Thus, action by the
managers alone in those areas which, under the stock corporation law,
require express shareholder approval do not bind the corporation.
B. The Board of Supervisors
The board of supervisors must consist of at least three members. Addi-
tional members, up to a maximum number of twenty-one, can be pro-
vided for in the charter depending upon the amount of the corporation's
capital. The total number of members must be divisible by three,"' how-
ever, since one-third of the board of supervisors must be elected by the
labor force.6" The first of these labor representatives must be a worker
employed by that enterprise. If two are to be elected, the second one must be
a white collar employee. If more than two are to be elected, union officials
may be elected after the requirements regarding the first two are met. If
the majority of the company's employees are women, at least one woman
must be elected.6' Members comprising the other two-thirds of the board
of supervisors are elected by the shareholders. 2 The supervisors' term of
55. Judgment of Nov. 19, 1926, 115 RGZ 246, 249.
56. A. Hueck, supra note 15, at 138.
57. BGB § 826 (C.H. Beck 1964). judgment of Nov. 5, 1934, 145 RGZ 311, 314, denied
relief to a plaintiff who had actual notice that the transaction he had entered Into exceeded
the purposes stated in the corporation's articles of incorporation.
58. See H. Wiirdinger, supra note 6, at 118-23.
59. AktG § 95.
60. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, Law of Oct. 11, 1952, [1952) BGBI. I 681 [hereinafter
cited as BVG]. This law does not apply to family corporations having less than five hundred
employees. For a short descriptive summary of the scope of this law, see E. Steefel, German
Commercial Law 103-06 (1963). Special provisions are applicable to corporations In mining,
iron and steel industries. Their board of supervisors must consist of eleven members. Five
are elected by the shareholders, five by the trade unions, and the last by a majority of the
other ten (but such majority must consist of at least three votes from each group). Gesetz
Uiber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsriiten und Vorstinden der
Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie, Law of May
21, 1951, [1951) BGB1. I 347. See also W. Goertsches, Die Vertetung der Arbeitnehmer Im
Aufsichtsrat von Aktiengesellschaften innerhalb von Konzernen nach dem Betriebsverfassungs-
gesetz (1962).
61. BVG § 76.
62. AktG § 101(1).
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office is limited by statute to a maximum of four years," but can be re-
duced to any shorter period by the shareholders or by provision in the
articles of incorporation.64 Labor representatives must be elected for the
same term as the other members of the board."
Any natural person may become a member of the board of supervisors,
provided he is not a member of the board of managers or an executive
officer of the corporation.60 No supervisor may be a member of more
than ten boards of supervisors.
Supervisors may be dismissed without cause before the expiration of
their term of office by a vote of seventy-five percent of the shares voted
at the meeting. The necessary vote may be reduced to a simple majority
by the articles of incorporation, but cannot be increased. s Labor repre-
sentatives can also be recalled without cause by a vote of seventy-five
percent of the employees eligible to vote."
The full board of supervisors must meet at least once every six
months.7' From among its membership it must appoint a chairman and
at least one deputy.7 1
The board's main function is to supervise the board of managers. For
this purpose, the board or any member may, at any time, request from
the board of managers written reports about corporate matters. The
board of supervisors has the right to inspect fully all corporate books,
records and inventories. - It has the statutory duty to call a shareholders'
meeting whenever the corporation's welfare requires it. 3 While none of
the managerial functions may be transferred to the board of supervisors,
the board or the articles of incorporation may provide that specific types
of transactions require its approval.74 This power may not be used, how-
63. AktG § 102(1).
64. R. Godin & H. Wiielmi, Aktiengesetz, Kommentar § 87, Arum. 3 (2d ed. 1950).
65. BVG § 76(2).
66. AktG §§ 100(1), 105(1). However, a board of supervisors member may temporarily
take the post of a manager who has been incapacitated. During such a period, the duration
of which must be specifically limited in advance and which may not exceed one year,
he cannot participate in the board of supervisors' work. AktG § 105(2).
67. AktG § 100(2)1.
68. Aktg § 103(1).
69. BVG § 76(5).
70. AktG § 110(3).
71. AktG § 107(1).
72. AktG § 111(1)-(2).
73. AktG § 111(3).
74. AktG § 111(4). If the board of supervisors refuses to consent to one of these
specified transactions, the board of managers may call a shareholders' meeting which, with
an affirmative vote of at least seventy-five percent of the shares actually voted, can override
the supervisors' decision. Id.
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ever, to such an extent as to circumvent the board of managers' statutory
power to run the corporation's business operations.
The board of supervisors has also been assigned specific statutory
duties. It not only represents the corporation in transactions and legal
suits between the corporation and the board of managers,7 but it also
handles the appointment and dismissal of members of the board of man-
agers. 7° In the performance of their duties, for which a compensation
reasonably related to the tasks performed may be paid," the supervisors
must adhere to the standard of conduct and judgment of a prudent busi-
nessman. The supervisors have the burden of proving observance of this
standard, and are jointly liable for damages resulting to the corporation
by its violation.78
C. The Shareholders' Meeting
Contrasted with the annual shareholders' meeting of the American
corporation, which to a large extent has assumed the characteristics of a
social get-together 79 at which management paints a rosy picture and
delivers panegyrics to itself and the stockholders, the shareholders' meet-
ing of the German corporation is an institution which has statutory powers
and restrictions. This institutional character does not, however, result in
more extensive shareholder control over management than in the United
States. As a matter of fact, under the extensive corporate law reform of
1937, the shareholders' meeting lost some of the power it had previously
exercised. Early analysis of the nature of corporations had emphasized
their financial aspects, i.e., its accumulation of capital from private inves-
tors who expected remuneration, could (within legal limits) do with their
property as they wished" and should, therefore, have a voice in the use
to which their property was put. This view became the basis for the share-
holders' meeting's status as the supreme corporate organ. Its decisions on
all corporate matters, except those which had been assigned by statute to
the exclusive jurisdiction of one of the other two organs, were final and
unassailable if legally valid. The board of managers was truly that-it
75. AktG § 112.
76. AktG § 84(1).
77. AktG § 113(1).
78. AktG §§ 93, 116.
79. A. Berle, supra note 5, at 7 stated that: "In the early days, when corporations were
still small, the stockholder powerfully influenced the director but today they are so far
apart that the stockholder can hardly communicate with management even by megaphone.
We go through the ancient forms and it is good that we do, but everyone knows that a
stockholders' meeting is a kind of ancient, meaningless ritual like some of the ceremonies
that go on with the mace in the House of Lords."
80. BGB § 903 (C.H. Beck 1964).
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managed the shareholders' property according to their specific instruc-
tions.
Such an allocation of power, while attractive to shareholders, becomes
unworkable, or at least difficult or inefficient, in a corporation with many
shareholders who are widely dispersed and unfamiliar with the technicali-
ties and problems of daily business operations. This factor, in addition to
the twentieth century recognition that the right to use property is sub-
ject to limitations based on public policy,8' led to a reallocation of power.
Presently, the statute provides that each corporate organ is supreme
within the sphere of activity allocated to it by statutory provisions. Thus,
except for the specific tasks given to the shareholders' meeting by stat-
ute,"' it no longer exercises control over the formulation of corporate
policy or the conduct of corporate operations. That power, as previously
discussed, is now vested in the board of managers, which performs its
tasks independently."3 Consequently, as far as possession of effective
power to determine most matters of corporate policy is concerned, the
board of managers reigns supreme. It is subject only to the board of
supervisors' subsequent inquiry into its conduct.
1. Specific Powers
There are, however, a number of important transactions for which
shareholder approval is required by statute. Thus, approval by seventy-
five percent of the shares represented at the meeting is necessary: to
amend the articles of incorporation,84 to dissolve or reorganize the cor-
poration,85 to merge it with another corporation, 0 to transfer corporate
assets, 7 and to purchase assets within two years after incorporation, the
value of which exceeds ten percent of the capital stock.s
Other functions allocated to the shareholders' meeting which require
only a simple majority of votes actually cast89 are: the appointment and
dismissal of the board of supervisors, 0 the appointment of annual audi-
tors,91 and the annual exoneration of managers and supervisors."
81. This restriction is now a constitutional norm in Germany. Grundgesetz art. 14 (1966)
(W. Ger.) provides that: "Property imposes duties. Its utilization must also serve for the
benefit of society." (author's translation).
82. AktG § 119(1).
83. See H. Wfirdinger, supra note 6, at 118.
84. AktG 9 179(2).
85. AktG §9 262(2), 293(1), 355(3).
86. AItG 9 340(2).
87. AktG § 360; see AktG § 359.
88. AktG 9 52.
89. AktG § 133(1).
90. AktG 9 101(1).
91. AktG § 163(1).




The regular annual shareholders' meeting can be called by the board
of managers0 3 after at least one month's notice. This period of notice
must be extended to allow deposit of shares if the articles of incorpora-
tion require such a deposit as a prerequisite for voting. In the absence of
such a requirement, shareholders who give three days notice of their in-
tended participation must be allowed to vote. 4
Special meetings may be called in accordance with statutory provi-
sions. For example, the board of supervisors must call a special meeting
if the corporation's well-being so requires."5 In addition, the board of
managers must call a special meeting upon receiving a written request
to do so from shareholders owning five percent or more of the corpora-
tion's capital stock."6 Failure to comply with such a request, which must
state the proposed meeting's purpose, may result in the shareholders
obtaining court permission to call the meeting. 7
D. Summary
This short summary of the German corporation's structure discloses
important similarities and differences between its nucleus of power and
that of the American corporation. Noticeable is the fact that both have
felt the need to create an organ which is not directly concerned with the
routine, daily problems of managing the enterprise. The separation of
beneficial ownership and control, therefore, has resulted in the inclusion
in the corporate structure of an "outsider" whose function is to check on
what is being done. But, beyond this point important divergences occur.
The German board of supervisors is truly that-supervisory, i.e., it in-
quires into the board of managers' conduct, usually after action has been
discussed in legal literature. Older writings and cases attributed to it full legal effect, so that
no corporate demand for damages could be asserted for injuries arising out of managers'
or supervisors' conduct once the exoneration resolution had been adopted. This view
has changed substantially over the years. Based on the statutory prohibition against corporate
renunciation of the right to compensatory damages within three years of the accrual of
such right (AktG § 93(4)), the exoneration resolution is now generally viewed as a
"continued confidence" vote which does not affect the corporation's right to assert damages
claimed thereafter. This is considered necessary to prevent majority shareholders from
obstructing the enforcement of such claims. See A. Baumbach & A. Hueck, Aktiengesetz § 104
Anm. 1-2 (12th ed. 1965); A. Hueck, supra note 15, at 154-55. Prior case law, as stated
above, is now expressed in the new statute. It expressly declares that such exoneration does
"9not" amount to a renunciation of the right to damages. AktG § 120(2).
93. AktG § 121(2).
94. AktG § 123(4).
95. AktG § 111(3).
96. AktG § 122(1).
97. AktG § 122(3).
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taken in order to see whether the managers acted legally. The adoption of
corporate policy for future actions rests with the managers, not with the
supervisors or (except in specific instances) with the shareholders. In
American law, however, the organ which reviews the conduct of manage-
ment officers also has the primary responsibility for corporate policy.
Therefore, since the board of directors merely delegates management
functions to the officers it, not the corporate officers, is principally liable
to the corporation for damages resulting from negligent business conduct.
Coupled with this difference in functions is the difference in shareholder
control over the corporate policy makers. Having the power to elect the
directors, the American shareholder directly selects the men who will
determine corporate policy. His German counterpart has no such direct
voice; he elects the supervisors who will appoint the managers who will
develop corporate policy. The same divergence occurs in the removal of
corporate policy makers. The American shareholder can remove the
directors of his corporation, but the German shareholder cannot remove
the board of managers except by going through the board of supervisors.
These differences give an indication of the general tenor of German
corporation law, i.e., the insulation of corporate management from direct
shareholder contact. This, of course, does not mean that principles of
honesty and fair play are forgotten. Statutory provisions setting limits
on management conduct abound. But, the methodology of enforcing ob-
servance of legal limitations differs. Consequently, the principal observa-
tion to be made with regard to these methods is that they put more
obstacles into the path of the shareholder seeking to utilize them than is
generally the case under American law. The nature of these obstacles in
the enforcement of individual shareholder rights is the subject of subse-
quent sections.
III. SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS
Since most small shareholders are primarily interested in receiving a
return on their investment, our first inquiry is directed to the legal prob-
lems surrounding the power to distribute corporate profits in the form of
dividends. Another direct incident of share ownership is the right to have
a voice in corporate affairs. The extent of shareholders' voting rights,
therefore, is the subject of our second inquiry. Before a shareholder can
utilize some of the other remedies which are his by virtue of his invest-
ment, he must have some means of finding out what management is doing.
The scope of his right to be informed about corporate conditions and
transactions is, therefore, the subject of our third inquiry.
The discussion of each of these topics under German law will be pre-
ceded by a short summary of the same topic under American law. The
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purpose is to enable the reader to recognize similarities and differences in
the two legal systems. Because of this limited objective, the discussion of
American law is informational and descriptive rather than analytical.
A. Dividend Rights
To the small shareholder one of the most important aspects of corporate
share ownership is the payment of dividends. The basic conflict of inter-
est between shareholder and management in this area is obvious. On the
one hand, the shareholder wants to receive as high a return on his money
as possible; on the other, management wants to utilize corporate profits
for business expansion, other investment, higher corporate salaries, etc.
This conflict is especially true where ownership of shares is widely scat-
tered, and the officers and directors of the corporation, while not holding
any large number of shares of their own, can perpetuate themselves in
office through a proxy system. A middle ground is usually established
between shareholders and management because each side realizes that
putting its own view into practice to the fullest extent will result in even-
tual harm. "Bleeding" the corporation by excessive dividend payments
results in fiscal anemia; starving the shareholder has a depressing effect
on the value of corporate shares. Yet, these may be intended effects in
abnormal situations. It is against the use of such disfavored practices
that legal restrictions are directed.
1. The Right to Dividends in American Law
Contrary to early English law which vested the power to declare divi-
dends in the "general court" of shareholders, 8 American law generally
vests such power in the board of directors. The grant of this power rests
either on a specific statutory authorization"0 or on an inference from the
universal statutory provision which gives the board of directors the power
to manage corporate business. Although some statutes make this grant of
power conditional on the absence of contrary provisions in the articles
of incorporation or bylaws,' 0 thus raising the possibility of allocating
98. 1 G. Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 461 (1959). Some charters of early
American corporations made similar provisions. See D. Kehl, Corporate Dividends § 53 (1941).
The English practice persists, subject to the limitation that the amount of the dividend de-
clared by the shareholders may not exceed the amount recommended by the board of
directors. The Companies Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, table A, § 115, sched. 1 (1948).
99. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170(a) (Supp. 1968), which provides that: "The
directors of every corporation . . . may declare and pay dividends upon the shares of Its
capital stock . .. .
100. See, e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 14A:7-14(1) (1969), which states that: "A corporation
may, from time to time, by action of its board, declare and pay dividends . . . except . . .




dividend declaration power to the shareholders, such practice does not
seem to occur with any noticeable frequency. Furthermore, the courts do
not construe this provision in a liberal fashion.10'
The "discretionary" power of directors to declare dividends, however,
is not free from legal restraint. Protection of creditors requires mainte-
nance of the corporation's financial solvency. Thus, by statute or on gen-
eral principles of creditors' rights, dividends may only be paid out of
funds legally available for that purpose. The standards employed to
determine such availability, such as, "earned surplus," "net profits," and
"nonimpairment of capital" tests, °2 do not need discussion here, since
this inquiry is directed into the shareholder's right to dividends which
could legally be declared.
Since the declaration of dividends rests in the directors' discretion, the
small shareholder has no effective intra-corporate remedy to overcome a
failure to declare a dividend, even though funds are available. His only
remedy is to bring a court action to compel a dividend declaration. In
most states, this is regarded as an equitable class action'05 and no espe-
cially burdensome procedural requirements are put in his path. Three
states, 04 however, regard such an action as a shareholder's derivative suit,
imposing upon the plaintiff the burdensome prerequisites of that type of
action. 0 5 In both cases, however, the substantive burden carried by the
shareholder is great. Courts, reluctant to substitute their own judgment on
the feasibility of paying a dividend for the directors' business judgment,
a judgment which involves consideration of business activity, expansion,
employment policies, investment, and tax consequences, have consistently
refused to order the declaration of a dividend in the absence of a showing
of abuse of discretion. Such abuse is generally found only where fraud,
bad faith, or clear unreasonableness are shown.
101. See L.L. Constantin & Co. v. R.P. Holding Corp., 56 N.J. Super. 411, 421, 153 A2d
378, 383 (Ch. 1959), where an amendment of the articles of incorporation requiring payment
of dividends on preferred stock was not enforced by the court because the corporation's
bylaws, which gave the directors the discretion to declare dividends, had not been amended.
This led to an "inconsistency" which was resolved in the directors' favor despite the fact
that, generally, the articles of incorporation take priority over the bylaws.
102. See 11 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations §§ 5335-48 (rev. ed. 1958); H. Henn,
Handbook of the Law of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises § 320-23 (1961);
D. Kehl, supra note 98, at § 25-30; Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law:
American Statutes and Cases, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 461 (1929).
103. Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956); Whittemore v. Continental
Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387 (D. Me. 1951).
104. Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E2d 482 (1939);
Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954); Thompson v. Thompson, 214
S.C. 61, 51 S.E.2d 169 (1948).
105. See H. Henn, supra note 102, at 352-53.
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The factual situation which must exist to indicate fraud or bad faith is
generally not too difficult to ascertain. Failing to declare dividends in
order to pay corporate officers excessive salaries or bonuses, to drive down
the purchase price of shares, to force shareholders to sell out, or to give
tax advantages to high income bracket shareholders are recognizable
examples. The real problem faced by the plaintiff shareholder in this area
is the difficulty of proving that these reasons are the motivating forces
behind the directors' refusal to declare a dividend. Combined with judicial
reluctance °6 to get involved in corporate policy decisions, the further
requirement of "clear and satisfactory proof" of fraud or bad faith'07 is
a difficult burden to sustain.
In situations not involving fraud or bad faith, the shareholders' diffi-
culty is even greater because of the elusive nature of unreasonableness.
Such a charge is mainly directed against the directors' wisdom and judg-
ment in refusing to declare a dividend, and consequently, asks the court to
do exactly what it does not want to do-evaluate corporate business policy.
Courts give great weight to a director's duty to refrain from declaring a
dividend where he has any honest doubt as to the wisdom of doing so.1°8
The most frequently advanced argument is that the directors are "un-
reasonably" accumulating surplus funds instead of declaring dividends.
Such a charge is generally overcome by showing the courts that present
or future business needs require retention of such surplus funds' 00° But
there are limits beyond which accumulation of surplus funds, especially
if in liquid form, may not go without being designated as unreasonable. 110
106. "In view of the varied economic, 'political' and taxing incidents that must be con-
sidered in making a decision of whether funds should be retained or distributed, the rule
[of directorial discretion] is a wise one. But as a brake upon directorial discretion, a prin-
ciple recognizing the right of participation by the shareholders in all the net earnings of
the company not reasonably needed for legitimate corporate purposes ought to have equal
weight. . . .The rule of directorial discretion has frequently, perhaps generally, been too
sacredly respected by the courts." N. Lattin, The Law of Corporations ch. 10, § 1, at 459
(1959).
107. Bickel v. Henry Bickel Co., 184 Ky. 582, 584, 212 S.W. 602, 603 (1919).
108. See, e.g., id. at 584-85, 212 S.W. at 603-04.
109. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 257 N.Y. 62, 67, 177 N.E.
309, 311 (1931).
110. Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387 (D. Me. 1951). Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) is often cited as the leading case for the
proposition that accumulation of surplus funds beyond the corporation's reasonable needs
is an abuse of directorial discretion. In this case, the defendant corporation was ordered
to pay out nearly twenty million dollars in dividends despite its contention that shareholders
should be satisfied with "average" dividends while the corporation used surplus funds for
capital improvements to better its products' technical qualities. It should be noted, however,
that this action also involved aspects of a power struggle within the (then) closely held
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A factor which should be considered in determining the permissibility of
accumulating surplus funds is the imposition of accumulated earnings
taxes. By definition, this tax is assessed only on funds not reasonably
necessary for the corporation's anticipated needs.,'
Thus, while the remedy to compel dividend declarations exists, its
effective use is hindered by judicial deference to directorial discretion and
judicial imposition of a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff. As a mat-
ter of actual practice, however, it should be pointed out that the large
American corporation's record of dividend policies shows few instances of
arbitrary abuse of discretion. Court actions to compel declarations of
dividends almost exclusively involve closely held corporations.
2. The Right to Dividends in German Law
Early German corporation law did not contain any substantive rules
regarding the power to declare dividends, although usually the power was
given to management under the articles of incorporation. 12 Only in the
late nineteenth century did an amendment to the Commercial Code re-
quire shareholder approval of the annual financial statement,'1 3 a policy
consonant with the growing recognition of shareholders as economic
"owners" of the corporation. This policy found its fullest expression in
the 1931 provision allocating to the shareholders' meeting, rather than to
management, the actual formulation of the annual financial statements
instead of merely their approval.1 14 The practical difficulties encountered
in having shareholders prepare and adopt a corporation's financial state-
ments resulted in a rapid change in this procedure. Under the 1937 re-
form of the stock corporation law, a reform largely designed to strengthen
the board of managers' powers, shareholders were virtually eliminated
from any participation in the formulation of dividend policies. Although
the shareholders' meeting was given the power to declare dividends by
express statutory provision,"' the actual control over whether or not
dividends would be declared, and in what amounts, was given to the
board of managers. This was assured, except in a very unusual situation,
corporation. Henry Ford, possessing effective control of management, attempted to "squeeze
out" Dodge's minority interest.
111. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 531-37. See United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297,
rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
112. TH Kronstein & C. Claussen, Publizitit und Gewinnverteilung ira neven Aktienrecht
121 (1960).
113. Handelsgesetzbuch [HBGJ § 239(b) (CH. Beck 1964). Law of July 18, 1884, [1884]
RGBL I 123, 162.
114. Law of Sept. 19, 1931, [1931) RGBI. I 493.
115. AktG § 126 (1937).
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by giving to the board managers exclusive power to prepare the annual
financial statements, and by limiting the source of dividend declarations
to funds made available for this purpose by management.
a. The Process of Dividend Policy Formulation
Under the Aktiengesetz of 1937
Putting the process of dividend policy formulation into statutory
terminology, the board of managers bad to prepare annually, within
the first three months of the corporation's business year, a balance sheet
and a profit and loss statement.11 Only those funds designated in the
financial statements as "net profits" were available for dividend pur-
poses. 1 7 The most important management power with respect to divi-
dend policy was the board of managers' practically unlimited discretion
to keep profits out of the "net profits" figure by allocating such sums to
reserve accounts. German law differentiates among three types of reserve
funds: "legal reserves" (Gesetzliche Riicklagen), "free reserves" (Freie
Riicklagen), and "silent" or "hidden reserves" (Stille Ricklagen). The
first two types of reserve accounts are also called "open reserves," since
they are itemized and visible figures in the annual financial statement,
whereas "hidden reserves" are not indicated therein by a specific entry.
The statutory provisions relating to legal reserves"" required that at
least five percent of the corporation's annual profit be allocated to this
specific reserve account until its total amount equaled ten percent of the
corporation's capital stock. The articles of incorporation could increase the
percentage of annual profits required to be put into the legal reserves
account and could also provide that such annual allocations continue
until a percentage of the capital stock higher than the statutory minimum
of ten percent was reached. These were two very effective ways to keep
part of the corporation's profits from being distributed as dividends. The
accumulated legal reserves could be used only for specific purposes des-
ignated by statute, the most important of which was the coverage of busi-
ness losses."19
Free reserves2 ' could be accumulated out of annual profits either on
the basis of provisions in the articles of incorporation, or, lacking such
specific regulation, on the basis of a board of managers' decision. If the
articles specified the purposes for which such reserves were to be retained,
allocations in excess of reasonable requirements to accomplish such pur-
116. AktG § 125 1 (1937). This period could be extended by an additional two months
by a provision in the articles of incorporation.
117. AktG § 126 I (1937).
118. AktG § 130 (1937).
119. AktG § 130 III (1937).
120. AktG §§ 125, 131B II (1937).
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poses were probably illegal.' 12 In the absence of an express statement of
specific purposes, however, the board of managers had unlimited power
to accumulate free reserves. The accumulation of free reserves under these
circumstances was not limited by any concept corresponding to the Amer-
ican "abuse of discretion" doctrine. It was, therefore, a most effective
control over the corporation's dividend policy.
Hidden reserves were not actual accumulated reserve funds appearing
in the financial statements, but represented the difference between specific
itemizations as they appeared in those statements and their actual value.
The purpose of the statutory regulations pertaining to the annual financial
statements was to protect creditors by publicizing the corporation's finan-
cial condition. Consequently, on the theory that creditors were not affected
thereby, there was no prohibition against understating assets and over-
stating liabilities."z Through these two practices management could
again prevent actually realized profits from reaching the "net profits"
entry.
Although the board of managers had practically unlimited power to
employ these methods of reserve accumulations, there was one procedural
limitation which could prevent abuse of the power. The annual financial
statements, prepared by the board of managers and examined by auditors
selected by the shareholders' meeting,123 had to be submitted to the board
of supervisors. In addition, accompanying these financial statements had
to be a recommendation for a dividend declaration. The board of super-
visors then had three alternatives-it could approve the statements, dis-
approve them, or could call for shareholder action thereon.
If the board of supervisors approved the financial report it became final.
The shareholders' meeting had no power to change it and was limited for
121. See H. Wfirdinger, Aktienrecht 68-69 (1959).
122. "Shareholders studying the financial statements may be fairly sure that net worth
and earnings of their company are not below the reported figures. Since understatements of
assets and overstatements of liabilities are both legal and common the real figures, however,
are largely a matter of guessing." von Falkenhausen & Steefel, Shareholders' Rights in
German Corporations, 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 407, 427 (1961). "Most German corporations
thus have two different sets of financial statements: one for the shareholders and one for
the tax collector." Id. at n.94.
123. AktG § 136 I (1937). The auditors' examination of the financial statements ,as
limited in scope. It checked for compliance with statutory requirements, but did not
affect the board of managers' decisions with respect to the formulation of free or hidden
reserves. AktG § 135 (1937). Minority shareholders who owned ten percent of the
capital stock for at least three months could contest the selection of auditors on grounds
of personal disqualification, such as, incompetence or loss of "independence" because of
long association with the corporation, or on grounds of failure to observe procedural re-
quirements. If the court found for the contesting shareholders, it had to appoint acceptable
new auditors. AktG § 136 1I-il (1937).
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dividend purposes to net profits as given in the report. Moreover, share-
holders could not initiate legal proceedings to invalidate the approved
financial report, except for specific defects designated by statute. These
defects were limited to the following situations: (1) the required audit
did not occur, (2) procedural regulations were not observed, (3) the
report was in violation of regulations adopted in the public interest or to
protect creditors, and (4) the report was in violation of "good morals.' 24
The narrow interpretation of these prerequisites was demonstrated by
the fact that not one court action since 1937 was successful in declaring
void a financial report approved by the managers and supervisors.
Thus, an intentional accumulation of excessive reserves, even if contrary
to the articles of incorporation, 20 could not be contested by legal action.
One writer 12 7 expressed the opinion that even the intentional accumula-
tion of excessive reserves for the admitted purpose of "starving" minority
shareholders would not be sufficiently opposed to "good morals" to justify
invalidating the financial report. Although such a result may seem rather
severe when compared to American corporate law, it must be remembered
that German law has no doctrine of fiduciary duties. Instead of declaring
the whole financial report void, the German approach is to leave the share-
holder injured by malicious management action to his tort remedy under
the Civil Code. 28 As a policy judgment, this may serve to avoid complica-
tions in intra-corporate functioning, but it sets no limit whatever to
attempts to "squeeze out" small shareholders.
The board of supervisors had no power to make changes in the financial
report. Its disagreement could be expressed by outright disapproval, in
which case the board of managers had to call a shareholders' meeting.
Rather than disapprove the report formally, the supervisors, in conjunc-
tion with the managers, could call a shareholders' meeting for the purpose
of adopting the financial report.2 In both cases, the preparation and
and approval of the report would be in the hands of the shareholders
who could decide independently, without regard to management recom-
mendations, on allocations to reserve funds. However, in practice, such
shareholder determination of the financial report was extremely rare.
b. Reform Proposals
One of the most important reasons for reforming the German stock
company law was to make the purchase of corporate shares more attrac-
124. AktG § 202 (1937).
126. Barz, Die Feststellung der Bilanz, in R. Hengeler, supra note 19, at 61, 62.
126. See von Falkenhausen & Steefel, supra note 122, at 420.
127. Barz, supra note 125, at 62. See also A. Baumbach & A. Hueck, Aktiengesetz § 202,
Anm. 2, § 195, Anm. 3 F (12th ed. 1965).
128. BGB § 826 (C.H. Beck 1964).
129. AktG § 125 HI-IV (1937).
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tive to small investors. The first draft of the new corporation law, there-
fore, proposed that the power to draw up the annual financial report be
returned to the shareholders' meeting. This power would give the share-
holders more control over the formulation of dividend policies. The pro-
cedure designed to accomplish this, however, was hardly more than a
change in statutory terminology.
The draft proposed 130 that the board of managers initially prepare the
balance sheet and profit and loss statement, leaving out all allocations to
reserve funds. This would have meant that the financial report no longer
determined the corporation's net profit, but only the "annual surplus" of
assets over liabilities. Attached to this report would have been a special
report listing allocations to reserve funds required by statute or by the
articles of incorporation, and recommending the allocation of the remain-
ing surplus between free reserves and dividends. If the board of super-
visors gave its approval to both of these reports, the shareholders' meeting
would have been bound by their entire content, i.e., valuation of assets,
liabilities, required reserve allocations and the "recommended" alloca-
tion between free reserves and dividends. The only discretionary power
given to the shareholders' meeting would have been to allocate more than
the recommended amount to free reserves. To prevent attempts by ma-
jority shareholders to "starve" minority shareholders, such increases could
not have gone beyond an amount "necessary for corporate conditions"
and could not have reduced the annual dividend below four percent. It
should be noted, however, that this limitation would have applied only to
shareholder attempts to increase reserve allocations and not to manage-
ment's initial power to recommend reserve allocations. The net effect of
this proposal would have been twofold. First, shareholders would have
had the additional power to increase reserve allocations beyond those sug-
gested by management, but could not have decreased management's
recommendation. Second, formal approval of the financial report as de-
termined by managers and supervisors would have been by means of a
shareholder resolution. Since the content of management's report would
have been binding on the shareholders' meeting, however, this pro-
cedural change from the then existing law (which provided for formal
approval by the board of supervisors) would have been a rather meaning-
less formality.
Widespread public criticism of this superficial change resulted in the
adoption of new provisions in the 1962 draft law.131 These provisions
attempted to give to the shareholders a more effective voice in the deter-
130. This discussion of the detailed provisions of the 1958 draft is based on Barz, supra
note 125, at 64-69.
131. See AktG Draft at 92.
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mination of dividend policies without sacrificing those management
powers necessary to assure the maintenance of sound business practices.
The explanatory text supporting these proposed changes analyzed the
conflicting considerations fully:
This solution [present law] is unsatisfactory. It does not sufficiently take into con-
sideration that shareholders, from an economic viewpoint, are the owners of the
enterprise. They bear the economic risk of their participation, through their invest-
ment they have furnished the basis for the enterprise and the realization of profits.
It is, therefore, not permissible to limit their power of decision to what management
in its discretion decides to leave them.
On the other hand, it is not advantageous to return to the law of the Commercial
Code and to give to the shareholders' meeting the complete power to prepare and
adopt the annual financial report. . . .The questions arising in that process are so
complicated that they cannot be discussed fully and decided properly by a multitude
of shareholders. Such a decision requires an extensive business background. A meeting
of numerous shareholders who are not acquainted with these problems is not equipped
to decide on the annual financial report. Such a decision realistically can only be
reached by a small group of experts. . . .The draft, therefore, envisions a com-
promise solution.'82
Under the proposed solution, the board of managers still had the respon-
sibility for preparing the financial report which, after being examined by
the auditors, would be submitted to the board of supervisors for examina-
tion and approval. If approval were given, the report would be final and
could not be changed by the shareholders' meeting. 83 The changes pro-
posed were not, however, reflected in this procedural regulation. Rather,
limitations imposed on the managers' power to build up reserves were
added to the statute to assure greater protection of shareholder interest.
Thus, whereas the accumulation of free reserves was formerly within
management's unlimited power, the draft statute transferred this power
to the shareholders because "shareholders as investors . . . must decide
what to do with profits which were earned with capital supplied by
them. , M
3 4
It was left up to the shareholders' meeting, therefore, to decide not
only whether and to what extent the corporation's profits were to be put
into free reserves, but also how much was to be paid out in dividends. Such
decision was to be reached by the usual shareholders' resolution requiring
only a simple majority vote for approval. To prevent abuse of this power,
the draft statute provided for a special remedy."" Where the reserve al-
location was not needed to assure the corporation's sound financial con-
dition in the near future, as determined by reasonable business judgment,
132. AktG Draft at 165-66 (author's translation).
13. .AktG Draft §§ 141, 150, 158, 160.
134. AktG Draft § 55, and explanation at 113.
135. AktG Draft § 246.
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and where it would have prevented the payment of a dividend of at least
four percent, shareholders owning five percent of the capital stock or
shares worth one million marks would have been allowed to contest the
resolution in court.
Since the corporation had to be assured of some reserves to cover future
needs, however, there had to be a way to keep shareholders from "bleed-
ing" it. This the draft law sought to accomplish by permitting provisions
in the articles of incorporation calling for specified allocations to free re-
serves or empowering management to make such reserve allocations pro-
vided that the total accumulation of free reserves did not exceed fifty
percent of the corporation's capital stock. As soon as that level had been
reached the provision in the articles empowering management to make
reserve allocations would have been suspended. 30 The shareholders' meet-
ing, however, could thereafter have resolved to pay additional profits into
the free reserve account by a simple majority vote, subject to the minority
shareholders' right to contest the resolution on the grounds discussed
earlier.
In addition to transferring management's control over free reserves to
the shareholders' meeting, the draft law also limited the managers' power
over hidden reserves. These, as described above, result from understate-
ments of assets or overstatements of liabilities. The draft law recognized
that such practices do not injure creditors, but concluded that they can be
used to withhold funds from dividend sources and prevent the prepara-
tion of accurate financial reports. Concluding that such reserves as were
necessary for future corporate needs could be accumulated as free re-
serves, 37 the draft, nevertheless, did not prohibit the formation of hidden
reserves. Instead, it merely attempted to prevent abuse thereof by provid-
ing that such reserves could be formed only to such an extent as "reason-
able business judgment" considered them necessary to maintain the cor-
poration's financial conditions in the near future.13 1 While the aim was
praiseworthy, the effectiveness of this limitation seems doubtful. It incor-
porated concepts which had no clearly recognizable substance and which
were likely to have been interpreted by courts, traditionally adverse to
giving shareholder rights a broad scope, to favor management.
The draft law retained the 1937 law's provisions which permitted the
board of supervisors to refer the submitted financial report to the share-
holders for approval either directly or after having disapproved it. New,
however, was the limitation that where such a submission occurred the
shareholders' meeting could only allocate those sums to open reserves
136. See note 134 supra.
137. AktG Draft, explanation at 175.
138. AktG Draft § 146 11-111.
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which were required by law or by the articles of incorporation. The share-
holders could not exceed these specifications by any discretionary reserve
allocation.' However, the draft, by providing that a shareholders' alloca-
tion of hidden reserves which exceeded limits set by law or the articles
did not constitute sufficient ground to contest the annual report,140 in
effect, would have permitted the unlimited accumulation of hidden re-
serves-a defect which would probably have been kept from becoming
oppressive only because referral of the financial report to the share-
holders' meeting is a rare practice.
c. Dividend Declarations Under the Aktiengesetz of 1965
The basic procedure of the 1937 law and the 1962 draft is retained in
the new statute.'4 ' The board of managers, therefore, must prepare during
the first three months of the corporation's new business year the annual
financial report, consisting of a balance sheet and a profit and loss state-
ment.142 The financial report must follow standard bookkeeping methods
and must be as accurate a reflection of the corporation's true financial
condition as it is possible to give within the board's statutory power to
evaluate corporate assets and liabilities. 43 Under the new statute, since
the scope of this power, which is the basis for the formation of
hidden reserves, is restricted somewhat, some improvement in the
reliability of corporate financial reports may be expected. The re-
port must be submitted to the auditors elected by the shareholders'
meeting. They must examine it for compliance with statutory provisions
and with the articles of incorporation. 44 The financial report, accom-
panied by the auditor's report and the board of managers' recommenda-
tions as to dividend payments and the allocation of profits to reserve
accounts, must then be submitted to the board of supervisors. 46 Unless
both boards decide to submit the report to the shareholders' meeting for
final determination, the board of supervisors must adopt or reject the sub-
mitted report.'46 The supervisors' failure to act on the report within two
months constitutes a rejection thereof, which requires submission of the
report to the shareholders' meeting for final determination and adop-
139. AktG Draft § 161 I-IH.
140. AktG Draft § 244.
141. See note 1 supra.
142. AktG § 148.
143. AktG § 149(1).
144. AktG § 162(1)-(2).
145. AktG § 170(1).
146. AktG § 172.
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tion.14 7 If the supervisors approve the report it is considered adopted and
not subject to modification by the shareholders' meeting.148
Although not accomplished in exactly the same way as the draft pro-
posed, management's power over the accumulation of reserves (and thus,
over dividends) is restricted under the new law. Where managers and
supervisors alone adopt the financial report, as is, and undoubtedly will
remain the usual case, they may allocate up to fifty percent of the annual
profit to free reserves, unless the articles of incorporation permit a higher
reserve allocation. Even where such a provision is present in the articles,
however, it becomes suspended totally as soon as the accumulated free
reserve fund exceeds fifty percent of the corporation's share capital, or
partially, to the extent it would exceed such limit.149 Significantly, in the
absence of such a provision, there is no limitation on the accumulation of
free reserves. As a result, management may allocate up to fifty percent of
annual profits to the free reserve account regardless of the total ac-
cumulation therein. Furthermore, reserve allocations beyond those that
management can legally make may be decided upon at the share-
holders' meeting by a simple majority vote.""0 Since the individual
shareholder's right to a dividend distribution pertains only to net profits
which have not been legally allocated to other uses on the basis of statu-
tory provisions, the articles of incorporation, or shareholder resolutions,'
this power of the majority shareholders is liable to abuse. The statute,
therefore, provides remedial relief by permitting shareholders owning at
least five percent of the corporation's capital stock or whose stock's par
value amounts to at least one million marks to bring an action to contest
a shareholder reserve allocation. 1152 The allocation complained of, how-
ever, must violate two standards before judicial relief can be granted.
First, in "reasonable business judgment," it must be unnecessary for the
maintenance of the company's vitality during a period for which its eco-
nomic needs can be determined, and second, it must reduce whatever
dividend is actually declared below the four percent level. The first pre-
requisite seems to be even hazier than the comparable American concept of
abuse of discretion, and will probably receive the same restricted applica-
tion by German courts which, like American courts, are reluctant to upset
business policy decisions.
Compared to the 1962 draft, however, the substantive provisions of the
new statute, seem more effective and far reaching in restraining manage-
147. AktG §§ 171(3), 173(1).
148. AktG § 172.
149. AktG § 58(2).
150. AktG §§ 58(3), 133(1).
151. AktG § 58(4).
152. AktG § 254.
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inent control over dividends. The individual shareholder, absent any
resolution for additional reserve allocations, is guaranteed a dividend
through the mandatory limitation on free reserve allocations. Although
this maximum limit may be raised by the articles of incorporation, such
a provision automatically loses its effectiveness when the accumulated
reserves reach the statutory maximum level. Of course, a reserve accumu-
lation of fifty percent of the corporation's capital stock takes a long time
to build up, and it is possible that this provision will be used to withhold
dividends from shareholders for an extended period. It would seem, how-
ever, that this statutory limitation is fairly effective in the one situation
where it is needed most, i.e., the deliberate withholding of dividends to
"starve" minority shareholders. Since in order to be effective such an in-
tentional plan requires allocation of practically all available profits to
reserves, the fifty percent limit would probably be reached in a relatively
short period.
The beneficial effects of this statutory check could have been easily un-
done if management's present power to understate assets and to overstate
liabilities was not curbed. The 1962 draft sought to restrict this power by
prohibiting the formation of hidden reserves which as a matter of reason-
able business judgment were not necessary to maintain the corporation's
financial condition in the near future. The drafters of the new statute
found two faults with this standard. First, it was too general to furnish
any reasonable guidelines to management. Second, it still would not have
informed shareholders of the company's real financial condition. The
legislative committees 53 deemed this second consideration too basic a
factor in the public's distrust of corporate investment to be permitted any
longer. Consequently, the statute, in additional provisions, 154 prescribes
in detail how each type of corporate property must be assessed or de-
preciated. Thus, the legislators, by combining these limitations with the
statutory obligation to furnish an accurate financial report,"" may have
achieved the desired goal. The assurance of greater accuracy is strength-
ened by the fact that the auditors who examine the report must determine
whether it meets statutory requirements, a task now made easier because
the new statute incorporates specific requirements, not the more general
test of reasonableness.
As enacted, the new statutory provisions allocating partial power to
both management and shareholders are a definite improvement over the
former system and both the 1958 and 1962 drafts. Whether this attempt
153. See Bericht des Abgeordneten Dr. Wilhelmi, Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wahlpertode,
Drucksache IV/3296, 30-31 (1962).
154. AktG §§ 152-56.
15. AktG § 149(1).
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to strike a workable balance between these two conflicting groups will be
effective and not subject to abuse remains to be seen.
B. The Shareholder's Right to Vote
In American, as well as in German law, the primary responsibility for
the formulation of corporate business policy and the transaction of cor-
porate business rests with management. Both legal systems, however,
reserve for shareholder decision statutorily specified matters of policy, or
transactions, such as amending the articles of incorporation, selling sub-
stantial parts of corporate assets, merging with another corporation or
dissolving the corporation. In these matters, and others, the individual
shareholder participates in the management process by expressing his
decision through his voting power. Since his exercise of his voting power,
though infrequent, involves the most fundamental aspects of corporate
policy, the scope of that power becomes of primary importance.
1. Voting Rights Under American Law
Early common law applied many non-stock corporation rules to stock
corporations. Consequently, the right to vote was for a long time regarded
as a personal right allowing each shareholder one vote regardless of the
number of shares he owned. Even in the United States, some of the early
corporate charters placed a maximum limit on the number of votes al-
lowed each shareholder. 56 Today, however, the right to vote is regarded
as an inherent part of stock ownership, and, therefore, as a property
right.15 As a result, the shareholder is entitled, by statute6 6 or as a mat-
ter of general law,'59 to one vote per share. Although some statutes would
permit per capita voting by appropriate provisions in the articles of in-
corporation, 6 ° such practice seems to be almost unknown in stock
corporations.' 6"
Statutes generally permit the issuance of nonvoting shares provided
156. The charter of the Union Bank, incorporated in Massachusetts in 1792, allowed a
maximum of ten votes to each shareholder. E. Dodd, American Business Corporations until
1860, at 203 (1954).
157. Brown v. AicLanahan, 148 F2d 703 (4th Cir. 1945).
158. Cal. Corp. Code § 2215 (West Supp. 1969); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212 (Supp.
1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:5-10 (1969).
159. Brooks v. State e-x rel. Richards, 3 Boyce 1 (Del.), 79 A. 790 (1911).
160. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 2215 (West Supp. 1969) which states that: "In the
absence of any contrary provision in the articles or in any statute relating to the election
of directors or to other particular matters, each [shareholder] is entitled to one vote for
each share."; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212(a) (Supp. 1968) states that: "Unless otherwise
provided in the certificate of incorporation . . . each stockholder shall . . . be entitled to
one vote for each share . .. .
161. See H. Henn, supra note 102, at § 191.
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there is at least one other class of shares which carries voting rights.102
Even absent such statutory authorization, articles of incorporation which
permit such issuance have been upheld as valid."0 3 In some states, how-
ever, there are constitutional and statutory limitations on the issuance of
nonvoting shares. These statutes either prohibit such shares or give to
those shareholders the right to vote on matters which would adversely
affect them.'0
a. Cumulative Voting
In many states, shareholders are given more than one vote per share for
the election of corporate directors. This "cumulative voting" system'1 5
is designed to allow minority shareholders to be represented on the board
of directors. Basically, it gives each share as many votes as there are
director vacancies to be filled, and permits the shareholder to cast all
votes for one director or to distribute them among as many candidates
as he wishes. Thus, if there are five directors to be elected, a shareholder
owning one hundred shares could either cast five hundred votes for one
candidate or divide his vote as he pleases. Despite criticism of the system
to the effect that it results in the election of partisan directors and causes
abuse "by persons who are motivated by narrow, selfish interests" and
"by opposition groups [who] use cumulative voting to secure a toe-hold
in a long-run fight for control of the company,"'" the fact that it permits
minority shareholders to express viewpoints has led to widespread consti-
162. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 2216 (West 1955).
163. People ex rel. Browne v. Keonig, 133 App. Div. 756, 118 N.Y.S. 136 (1st Dep't
1909); Saint Regis Candies, Inc. v. Hovas, 117 Tex. 313, 3 S.W.2d 429 (1928).
164. In Illinois, nonvoting shares are unconstitutional, People ex rel. Watseka Tel. Co. v.
Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922). A similar holding by the West Virginia court,
State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 142 W. Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d 171 (1956),
was overruled by amending the state constitution, W. Va. Cost. art. 11, § 4. Even where
permitted, nonvoting shares may be entitled to vote under special circumstances. Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 242(d) (2) (Supp. 1968) provides that: "If any proposed amendment would
alter or change the preferences, special rights or powers given to any one or more classes
of stock by the certificate of incorporation, so as to affect such class or classes of stock
adversely, or would increase or decrease the number of authorized shares of any class or
classes of stock, or would increase or decrease the par value thereof, then the holders of the
stock of each class of stock so affected by the amendment shall be entitled to vote as a
class upon such amendment, whether by the terms of the certificate of incorporation such
class be entitled to vote or not; and the affirmative vote of a majority in interest of each
such class of stock so affected by the amendment shall be necessary to the adoption
thereof . . . ."; cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 804 (1963). See also ABA-ALI Model Bus.
Corp. Act §§ 60, 73, 80, 84, 89 (rev. ed. 1969).
165. See C. Williams, Cumulative Voting for Directors (1951); Cole, Legal and Mathe-
matical Aspects of Cumulative Voting, 2 S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950).
166. W. Carey, Cases and Materials on Corporations 288 (4th ed. unabr. 1969).
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tutional and legislative prescription of the system.16 7 However, except for
California, the states having the largest number of corporations only
permit, but do not require, cumulative voting.' To weaken the effect of
cumulative voting, many corporations in their articles of incorporation
provide for the election of "staggered" or "classified" boards of directors.
This results in the election of only part of the board each year. Whether
such practice is unconstitutional in states making cumulative voting man-
datory has been the subject of conflicting decisions and much argument.""
In at least two states statutory provisions have resolved the conflict by
providing that all directors must be elected annually -17 0 Where directors
are subject to removal without cause by a simple majority vote, the
director elected by minority shareholders through cumulative voting could
easily be removed. To prevent such nullification of minority rights, some
states'7' have enacted statutes allowing the removal of an individual
director only if the number of cumulated votes opposing his removal are
insufficient to elect him.
b. The Proxy System
Early common law required shareholders to attend the shareholders'
meeting in person in order to vote.'7 - Today, since a quorum of share-
holders must be present at a shareholders' meeting in order to conduct
167. Cumulative voting is required in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missisppi, Mi.souri,
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. See H. Henn, supra note 102, at
293 nn.13 & 14.
168. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 214 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 618
(1963). If the articles of incorporation do not prohibit cumulative voting, Minnesota,
(Minn. Stat. Ann. § 301.26(3) (1969)) permits shareholders who notify the corporation's
president or secretary not less than 24 hours before the election that they intend to cumulate
their votes to engage in such voting for the election of directors.
169. Classified boards are unconstitutional: Wolfson v. Avery, 6 111. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d
701 (1955); State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 IV. Va. 315, 101 S.E.2d 834 (1958). Contra,
Bohannan v. Corporation Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957) ; Janney v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956); see Sell & Fuge, Impact of Classified
Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
151 (1956); 69 Harv. L. Rev. 380 (1955).
170. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 805, 2201 (West 1955); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-36.34 (1965).
171. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 810 (West 1955) states that: "[Ulniess the entire board is
removed, an individual director shall not be removed if the number of shares voted against
the resolution for his removal exceeds the quotient arrived at when the total number of
outstanding shares entitled to vote is divided by one plus the authorized number of
directors." See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.13 (1967); Blinn. Stat. Ann. § 301.29 (1969);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1405 (1967); 51 Mich. L. Rev. 744 (1953).
172. W. Carey, supra note 166, at 254.
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business, 173 it would be practically impossible for most large corporations
to convene a legally constituted meeting. Corporate shares are widely
dispersed among small shareholders who have no desire to attend such a
meeting. Although the common law rule still persists absent any contrary
provision, present statutes generally permit voting by proxy.17" Even
without such statutory permission, proxy voting may be validated by
provisions in the articles of incorporation or bylaws. 76 Proxies are usually
required to be in writing and their duration is normally specified by
statute, although the proxy itself may specify a different duration not
exceeding a stated maximum period. 76
c. Federal Regulation of Proxy Solicitations
Because in large corporations the proxy system has lent itself so well
to the self-perpetuation of management, it is regulated by a federal stat-
ute177 administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The literature178 concerned with the legal problems of federal regulation
of proxies is as voluminous as the problems themselves, and only a very
brief description of the regulatory process is attempted here.
The basic provision giving the SEC power to regulate proxies also de-
fines the scope of that power. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
173. What constitutes a quorum is usually determined by statutory provisions. These
may specifically designate what percentage of the corporation's voting shares is sufficient
for a quorum, Cal. Corp. Code § 2211 (West Supp. 1969), or may permit corporate articles
of incorporation or bylaws to specify a percentage differing from the statutory one, Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 301.25(7) (1969), provided such percentage is not set below a specified
minimum, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.265 (1966).
174. See ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 33 (rev. ed. 1969) which states that:
"A shareholder may vote either in person or by proxy ...."
175. Worth Mfg. Co. v. Bingham, 116 F. 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1902); see Axe, Corporate
Proxies, 41 Mich. L Rev. 38 (1942).
176. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 2226 (West 1955) ("A proxy is not valid after the expira-
tion of eleven (11) months from the date of its execution unless the person executing It
specifies therein the length of time for which it is to continue in force, which in no case shall
exceed seven (7) years from the date of its execution."); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212(b)
(Supp. 1968) ("[N]o such proxy shall be voted or acted upon after three years from Its
date, unless the proxy provides for a longer period."); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:5-19 (1969)
("[I]n no event shall a proxy be valid after 3 years from the date of elecution.").
177. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964, Supp. IV, 1969).
178. See, e.g., 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 857-1036 (2d ed. 1960, Supp. 1962).
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proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to Section 781 of this title.179
To implement this statutory power, the SEC has promulgated Regula-
tion X-14.1s' This regulation consists of eleven rules which are applicable
to every proxy solicitation sent to holders of shares listed with the SEC as
required by law. In addition to the rules, Schedules 14A and 14B specify the
information required to be included in the proxy statement which, together
with the actual solicitation, must be furnished to every shareholder.18'
The required information covers such items as: the proxy's revocability;
the identity and share interest of the person or persons making the solic-
itation; who bears the solicitation costs; the identification of the various
classes of shares entitled to vote and the number of outstanding shares in
each class; the details on bonus, profit sharing, pension, retirement and
other remuneration plans which will be voted on at the meeting; full
information about planned issuance of securities requiring shareholder
approval; the details of planned mergers, consolidations and other ac-
quisitions; and full information about nominees for director posts, in-
cluding their activities for the last five years, their share interest, salaries,
bonuses and other remuneration received or to be received. If the proxy
solicitation relates to a meeting at which directors are to be elected,
the proxy statement must be accompanied by an annual report containing
"such financial statements for the last two fiscal years... as will in the
opinion of the management adequately reflect the financial position ...
and results of... operations" of the corporation'82 The proxy form, which
is to be signed by the solicited shareholder, must clearly indicate the matters
upon which action is to be taken at the meeting, and must be so organized
that the person solicited can make a choice "between approval or disap-
proval of each matter or group of related matters"'8e Preliminary copies
of the proxy statements and proxy forms must be submitted to the SEC
at least ten days before they are to be sent out to the shareholders.'8
These filed materials are examined by the Commision staff for accuracy,
clarity and fullness of disclosure. Defects are sought to be corrected
through letters of comment and informal conferences. Thereafter, copies
of the materials actually sent out to the shareholders must be submitted
to the SEC and to the security exchange on which the stock is listed."'
179. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1969).
181. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1969).
182. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1969).
183. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (1969).




Such "definitive" materials are again examined by the SEC and false or
misleading statements found therein may result in actions to enjoin the
corporation from soliciting proxies through the mails or other methods of
interstate communications, or may result in criminal prosecution.180
The proxy rules have greatly improved a situation which had afforded
shareholders little opportunity to participate meaningfully in corporate
affairs. As the leading writer on the subject has concluded:
The proxy rules are very likely the most effective disclosure device in the SEC scheme
of things. The proxy literature, unlike the application for registration and the statu-
tory reports, gets into the hands of investors. Unlike the Securities Act prospectus, it
gets there in time. It is more readable than any of these other documents. And it
gets to a great many people who never see a prospectus. Moreover, there are indica-
tions . . that -the indirect influence of the proxy rules, through their infiltration of
the general law of notice to security holders, may in the long run be more significant
than their direct impact.' 8 7
The last statement in the above quotation reflects the feeling of frus-
tration prevalent for many years because the proxy rules' direct effect
was limited to those corporations which listed their shares on national
stock exchanges. Since the great majority of corporations were not so
registered, most of the nation's stockholders did not receive the benefit
of this legislation. Almost since the original enactment of the Securities
Exchange Act, efforts to amend it in order to widen its scope were numer-
ous and fervent.' Not until 1964, however, were these efforts rewarded
with success.
The long awaited amendment attempts to cure two defects in the proxy
rules' applicability. First, it greatly enlarges the number of companies
affected by the proxy rules. It provides that every corporation not listed
on a national exchange, which is "engaged in interstate commerce, or in
a business affecting interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded
by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce" must register such security with the SEC if its total assets exceed
$1,000,000 and if its shares are held by 500 or more shareholders."8 9
186. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969) states that: "No solicitation . . . shall be made by
means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communica-
tion ... containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which
omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false
or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has
become false or misleading."
187. 2 L. Loss, supra note 178, at 1027.
188. For a detailed account of such amendment proposals and their fate, see Id. at
1149-64.




Thus, the determining factor is no longer listing on a national stock
exchange, but registration with the SEC under a law directing registration
for companies of a specified size. Second, under prior law even a company
listed on a national exchange could evade the proxy rules by simply not
soliciting any proxies, a practice followed as late as 1961 by 19% of the
companies listed on national exchanges.11° Since 1955, the New York
Stock Exchange has exerted its influence to reduce this percentage,
informing recalcitrant companies that delisting would be considered for
those corporations which did not solicit proxies after 1961."10 The 1964
amendment seeks to eliminate, or to compensate for, the failure to solicit
proxies by requiring every corporation which is registered with the SEC
and does not solicit proxies to file with the Commission and transmit to
stockholders "information substantially equivalent to the information
which would be required to be transmitted if a solicitation were made."102
d. Preemptive Rights
An unlimited management power to issue additional shares of stock
not only would reduce the individual shareholder's proportionate interest
in dividends and corporate assets, but would also effectively dilute the
shareholder's vote and, consequently, his only means of control over
management. Regarding such a practice as a violation of management's
duty of fairness to all shareholders, early court decisions 1 3 developed the
doctrine of preemptive rights. This doctrine necessitates that manage-
ment give present shareholders the opportunity to purchase that part of
a new issue of shares which is proportionate to their existing share inter-
est before such shares are either offered to outsiders or are sold to other
present shareholders in excess of their proportionate interest. The pre-
emptive right extends both to the issuance of newly authorized shares,'"
which normally requires shareholder approval and amendment of the
articles of incorporation, and to additional issues of originally authorized
shares. 9 5 The right applies to the last at least where the interval between
the original authorization and the contemplated issue has been so long
as to give 1resent shareholders an equitable right to preserve their long
190. 27 SEC Ann. Rep. 73 (1961).
191. 2 L. Loss, supra note 178, at 1028.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1964).
193. Eidman v. Bowman, 58 Ill. 444 (1871); Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 363 (1807).
For commentary see Drinker, The Pre-nptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New
Shares, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 586 (1930); Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 Yale L.J.
563 (1929); Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 186 (1928).
194. Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 28S, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906).
195. Titus v. Paul State Bank, 32 Idaho 23, 179 P. 514 (1919); Glenn v. Kittanning
Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 510, 103 A. 340 (1918).
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maintained proportionate interest unchanged.19 Although early cases'0 7
held that the preemptive right required management to offer shares to
shareholders at par value, later cases took the more realistic view that
shareholders must pay the market value for such shares. 9 "
Today shareholders' preemptive rights are regulated by statute in
practically all states. Some provide for the right, but permit its abroga-
tion through provisions in the articles of incorporation or bylaws.' 9
Others deny the right unless affirmative provisions in the articles ex-
pressly grant it.200 A few statutes grant the right but incorporate the
exceptions developed at common law.2' These exceptions generally per-
tain to shares issued in exchange for property or services, treasury shares,
shares issued to satisfy conversion or option rights and shares issued in
connection with a merger or consolidation. It should be noted, however,
that even where preemptive rights are not granted, general equitable
principles of fiduciary duties are still applicable to new or additional
issues of shares and may be enforced against directors or majority share-
holders. Therefore, attempts to dilute the minority shareholders' voting
power may be resisted by relying on the doctrine of "equitable lim-
itations. 20 2
e. The Exercise of Voting Rights
The mere fact that a shareholder has an interest in the matter being
voted upon is not a sufficient reason to disqualify him from voting.
Therefore, he can vote to ratify contracts or business transactions be-
tween himself and the corporation from which he would derive an eco-
nomic benefit, provided such transactions are fair and concluded in "good
faith. ' 203 Just as majority shareholders, however, minority and individual
196. The court in Carlson v. Ringgold County Mut. Tel. Co., 252 Iowa 748, 108 N.W.2d
478 (1961) enforced the preemptive right where shares originally authorized but not issued
were offered for sale to outsiders 40 years later. See also Thurmond v. Paragon Colliery Co.,
82 W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918). Where no unreasonable time has elapsed between the
original authorization and the presently contemplated issue of shares, the existence of pre-
emptive rights may be denied because of the implied understanding among shareholdcrs and
management that all shares would be issued. Dunlay v. Avenue M. Garage & Repair Co.,
253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930).
197. Hammond v. Edison Illuminating Co., 131 Mich. 79, 90 N.W. 1040 (1902);
Cunningham's Appeal, 108 Pa. 546 (1885).
198. McClanahan v. Heidelberg Brewing Co., 303 Ky. 739, 199 S.W.2d 127 (1947);
Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906).
199. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 505 (Supp. 1969), 622 (1963).
200. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 1106 (West 1955).
201. E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 1701.15 (Page 1964).
202. See W. Carey, supra note 166, at 1133.
203. Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890),
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shareholders have a fiduciary duty to the corporation, and, perhaps, to the
majority shareholder, not to use their voting power for their own benefit
where principles of fairness and good faith would be violated.
2. Voting Rights Under German Law
Under German law the right to vote is regarded as an "inherent part
of membership"204 in the corporation and, as such, may not be restricted
except as expressly permitted by law. Every share, -20 5 except preferred
shares (Vorzugsaktien) -0 carries voting rights. The new statute provides
two permissible methods for altering the normal ratio of one vote per
share.0 7
One method is to allocate to each share more than one vote (Mehrstirm-
rechtsaktien). Permitted prior to the 1937 reform of the German
corporation law, this practice was widely abused. It was used mainly to
retain corporate control in the hands of the family shareholders who
originally founded the corporation but needed outside capital to keep it
going. It was also employed by corporations to get effective control of
other companies with a minimum outlay of capital. For example, a
corporation would buy a controlling interest in another company, use its
voting power to give multiple votes to part of the shares it owned, and
then sell the other shares to the public. It thereby recouped most of its
investment, and through the retained multiple-vote shares, maintained
effective control of the subsidiary. The 1937 law,208 however, basically
204. H. Wurdinger, supra note 121, at 72.
205. AtG § 12(1).
206. The issuance of preferred shares is relatively rare and is strictly regulated by statute.
Preferred shareholders have cumulative dividend rights unless the articles of incorporation
provide differently. Judgment of April 22, 1953, 9 BGHZ 279. The total par value of
preferred shares may not exceed the par value of all other shares issued. AkG § 139(2).
Except for the fact that preferred shareholders have no voting rights, they are given all
other rights inherent in share ownership. AktG § 140(l). Where preferred shareholders do
not receive their annual dividend, and the full dividend for two years is not paid by the
end of the following business year, preferred shareholders automatically have full voting
rights until all cumulated preferred dividends are paid. AktG § 140(2). Although, under
normal circumstances, preferred shareholders cannot vote on amendments to the artides
of incorporation, any amendment which limits or seeks to abolish any of their rights re-
quires an affirmative vote of seventy-five percent of the preferred shares voted at a spedal
meeting called for that purpose. AktG § 141. The same applies if the corporation seeks to
issue additional preferred shares, unless such a plan is expressly reserved to the corporation
when the original preferred shares are issued. Id.
207. Shares must have a par value. AktG § 6. Despite proposals to permit no-par shares,
the new law retains this provision. A corporation may have a series of shares with different
par values, however, as long as the value is in multiples of one hundred marks. AktG
§ 8(2). This is necessary in order to equalize voting power.
208. AktG § 12 II (1937).
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prohibited the issuance of shares with disproportionate voting rights, but
provided for exceptions through express permission by the Ministers of
Economics and Justice.
Under the 1937 statute, multiple-vote shares, even if permitted, were
given effect only in those situations requiring merely a majority vote of
shares. Matters which by statute required approval of a specific part of
the capital investment were, therefore, not affected. Consequently, since
the amendment of the articles of incorporation, the increase in capital
stock, mergers and other matters of fundamental corporate concern had to
be approved by seventy-five percent of the capital stock, holders of multi-
ple vote shares could, in these cases, only cast votes proportionate to their
actual investment interest.
A traditional argument for the retention of multiple-vote shares has
been that it is a useful and necessary device to prevent "foreign domina-
tion" of corporations. In this context, the term "foreign" refers both to
citizens of other countries and to domestic competitors who could be
prevented from taking over corporations by giving disproportionate
voting power to "insiders." The draft law, however, emphatically rejected
this device, maintaining that, where necessary, outside domination could
be prevented by means equally effective yet less amenable to abuse. In
eliminating even the exceptional utilization of multiple-vote shares, the
drafters pointed out that the issuance of registered instead of bearer
shares, or the conversion of bearer into registered shares, could prevent
outside domination if the subsequent transfer of registered shares were
made subject to corporate approval."' Another method of preventing
undesired domination was the issuance of preferred shares which carried
no voting rights. Despite these arguments, however, the Bundestag re-
tained the law permitting multiple-vote shares where the appropriate
state government in which the corporation has its principal office gives
its approval. The new statute delegates to the states the power to give
such permission for the protection of predominant economic needs.210
Another permissible method of changing the basic ratio of one vote per
share is to limit by provisions in the articles of incorporation the number
of votes which any one shareholder may cast .21 This may be done by
209. AktG Draft § 12, and explanation at 98. Bearer shares can be transferred merely
by delivery and the right to transfer them cannot be restricted. Registered shares, however,
are transferred by endorsement (AktG § 68(1)) and the transferee must give evidence of
possession and transfer before his name will be entered on corporate records as the owner
of the shares (AktG § 68(3)). The articles of incorporation may make the transfer of
registered shares conditional on corporate approval which, if no contrary provision Is made,
must be obtained from the board of managers. The articles also may specify the reasons
for which a transfer of such shares may be denied. AktG § 68(2).
210. AktG § 12(2).
211. AktG § 134(1).
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restricting each shareholder, regardless of the value of his total invest-
ment, to a maximum number of votes, or by providing that shares held
by any one person in excess of a certain number carry only limited
voting rights. (For example, after the first 100 shares, each 10 shares
may carry only one vote). Although the 1937 statute originally required
that such authorization be contained in the articles of incorporation,
a subsequent amendment of the corporation law required that the Min-
isters of Economics and Justice approve any such plan.21 2 The new law
retains the 1937 statute's method of limiting voting rights specifying,
however, that the plan used may not be applied only to a specific share-
holder. The necessity of obtaining ministerial approval for such limita-
tions has been eliminated, thus leaving the decision to adopt them en-
tirely within the corporation. 13 With regard to a vote which, by statute
or the articles of incorporation, requires a majority of the capital shares
of the corporation, a limitation of voting rights adopted under this statu-
tory section is not effective.2 14
As under American law, German law does not prevent a shareholder
from voting his shares on a matter merely because he would derive a
benefit therefrom. Instead, protection against possible abuse is provided
by allowing one to bring a court action to contest a resolution's validity
on the ground that the purpose of the shareholder's vote was to obtain
special advantages for himself or a third person to the detriment of the
corporation or the other shareholders. 1 5 In addition, the statute prohibits
the casting of shareholder votes in two specific cases. 10 In the first,
neither a manager nor a supervisor may vote his shares on a resolution
which would result in his exoneration from liability to the corporation,
and similarly, in the second, no shareholder can vote his shares when the
resolution is directed toward absolving him from any corporate obliga-
tion. This statutory prohibition of voting is exhaustive. Consequently,
shareholders may vote to elect themselves supervisors and to grant ben-
efits to themselves on their own retirement.217
a. Exercise of Voting Rights Through Agents
Except for corporate matters which require approval of at least
seventy-five percent of the corporation's capital stock represented at
the meeting, all other resolutions are decided by simple majority vote.21
212. Dritte Durchfiihrungsverorodnung zum Aktiengesetz § 13, Law of Dc. 21, 1938,
[19381 RGB1. I 1839.
213. AktG § 134(1).
214. Id.
215. AktG § 243(2).
216. AktG § 136(1).
217. Judgment of Sept. 29, 1955, 18 BGHZ 205.
218. AktG § 133(1).
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There is no quorum requirement, and management's interest in share-
holder participation in the annual meeting is not strong. This lack of
necessary shareholder participation is no doubt one of the basic reasons
why a proxy system similar to that found in the United States and
several other European countries has not developed in Germany. Because
of the same practical circumstances, i.e., the dispersal of shares among
large numbers of shareholders who cannot attend meetings, but who want
to have their votes counted, the new statute-2 19 provides two ways by
which absent shareholders can vote on corporate resolutions.
First, a shareholder may give to another person a power of attorney
(Vollinacht) to vote his shares at the meeting. This power must be in
writing, signed by the shareholder, and deposited with the corporation.
Consequently, a telegraphic power of attorney is not valid. 2 ' The corp-
oration's articles of incorporation may not prohibit the use of such
powers,2 1' but may restrict their use by providing that they can only be
given to persons meeting specified qualifications, for example, other
shareholders. 22 2 Such qualifications, however, may not be drawn so
narrowly as to prevent the shareholder from executing a power because
he cannot find a person competent to exercise it.
Second, because most shareholders deposit their shares with their
bank, the more practical and most widely used method for absent share-
holders to vote is to give the bank authorization (Ermichtigung) to vote
the shares. This well established system of "depositary voting" (Depots-
timmrecht) has recently come under severe attack. Due to its great
importance, a detailed analysis of its scope under prior law is necessary.
The bank's authorization had to be in writing. It was valid for fifteen
months, but could be revoked at any time. The standard authorization
permitted the bank to vote the deposited shares in its own name rather
than in the name of their legal owner.223 Although the authorization had
to identify specifically the particular bank which was authorized to vote
the shares, the fact that the instrument commonly used was an authoriza-
tion rather than a power of attorney meant that the bank could there-
after, without the shareowner's permission, authorize a third person to
vote the shares. This practice was widely followed by banks which "lent"
votes to other banks. 24 The authorization normally covered all shares on
deposit with the bank. Separate authorizations were, therefore, not
needed for shares of each corporation in a diversified portfolio. Where
219. AktG §§ 134(3), 135.
220. BGB § 126 (C.H. Beck 1964); Judgment of May 27, 1957, 24 BGHZ 297.
221. Judgment of May 23, 1903, 55 RGZ 41.
222. AktG § 134(4).
223. AktG § 114 IV (1937).
224. See A. Iueck, Gesellschaftsrecht 149-50 (11th ed. 1963).
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the shareholder informed the bank of the manner in which to vote his
shares, his instructions were binding under Civil Code provisions.2" The
bank, however, was not legally obligated to ask for specific instruc-
tions, and the authorization forms which the bank normally furnished
made no provision therefor.-
To realize the full implications of this process, it must be remembered
that the great majority of shares in Germany are bearer shares, the
holders of which are unidentified. Consequently, there was no direct
means of making available to shareholders information pertaining to the
annual meeting's agenda. The 1937 Aktiengesetz merely required that
notice of the meeting be published,2 r and that shareholders who asked
to be informed be furnished copies of the agenda.-2" Other shareholders
could obtain this information at the bank which held their shares, since
corporations customarily furnished such copies to all the banks. Needless
to say, the majority of small shareholders would sign the authorization
furnished by the bank without inquiring into the nature of the resolu-
tions which their shares would support or reject. To silence criticism of
this practice, the banks themselves drafted a set of general rules' regu-
lating the exercise of their authority to vote such shares. These rules
required banks to follow shareholder instructions when given, and to
exercise the voting right in the shareholder's interest when instructions
were lacking. In addition, banks had to notify shareholders and ask for
instructions on how to vote their shares if on the meeting's agenda were
any resolutions which would amend the articles of incorporation or which,
by statute, required an affirmative vote of seventy-five percent of the
corporation's capital stock voted at the meeting. Also, if the bank
received notice of any expressed opposition to particular resolutions at
least two weeks before the meeting (an unlikely situation because of the
notice requirements discussed earlier), it had to notify the shareholder
and inform him, absent contrary instructions from him, of how the bank
intended to vote his shares.
These self-imposed rules neither stilled criticism nor prevented abuse.
225. BGB § 665 (C.H. Beck 1964) would permit the bank to deviate from the share-
holder's instructions if it thought that under the particular circumstances the shareholder
would permit such deviation. Notice of intended deviation and answer from the share-
holder should precede the bank's deviation from instructions unless danger could result
from such a delay.
226. See Heinsius, Die Vertretung bei der Auslibung des Stimmrechtes nach amerikani-
schem Aktienrecht, 17 Betriebs-Berater 824 (1962).
227. AktG § 105 II (1937).
228. AktG §§ 108, 109 (1937).
229. "'Grundsitze fir die Ausiibung des Stimmrechts auf Grund einer Erm'ichtigung
nach § 114 Abs. 4 AktG.'" Heinsius, supra note 226, at 826.
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The traditional close alliance between banks and large corporations
remained the basis for strong protests against use of such votes to further
bank interests or to support management over shareholders. Such conflicts
of interest could hardly be avoided since German banks not only provided
large and numerous loans to corporations because other sources of
capital were scarce after the currency devaluation of 1948,230 but also be-
cause they frequently were large corporate shareholders themselves. Al-
though many writers expressed differing opinions on the extent of bank
abuse of their voting power,23' it is true that banks normally would vote
for management proposals.3 2
b. Reform Proposals
It is not surprising, therefore, that the law reform drafters' attempt
to improve this system received from legal writers extensive analysis,
comment and criticism.233 The justification for the proposed change is
noteworthy because it did not establish that actual abuses required
reform, but that change was justified because of the persistent arguments
about abuses:
The [present] rules have not been able to end the arguments about the need for and
the administration of the exercise of voting rights through banks. Time and again it
is maintained that the system of allowing banks to vote shares conceals conflicts of
interest. In cases of doubt, the bank would have a tendency to give preference to its
own interests in the corporation not to those of the shareholder. . . . Not share-
holders, but the banks decide in their discretion how to vote. Corporate management
is, therefore, no longer under the shareholders' supervision. It is not accountable to
anyone. Regardless of whether and how far these assertions have substance, it is not
possible to maintain the depositary voting system as one of the foundations of the
corporate system on a permanent basis in this opinion struggle. Corporations, as
well as banks, must be protected from the disturbances created by it.234
230. While German savers invested a total of over $44,000,000,000 in savings accounts
and bonds since 1948, their investment in new shares of stock in that same period amounted
to only $4,000,000,000. Time, June 4, 1965, at 82.
231. For two extensive analyses and recapitulations of different viewpoints, see R.
Wieth6lter, supra note 23, at 322-31; Klug, Die Neuordnung des Bankenstimmrechts, In
Aktuelle Probleme aus dem Gesellschaftsrecht und anderen Rechtsgebieten, Festschrift fUr
Walter Schmidt 39 (1959).
232. R. WiethB1ter, supra note 23, at 334.
233. E.g., A. Hueck, supra not 224, at 149-50; I. Rasch, Richtige und falsche Wege
der Aktienrechtsreform 9-13 (1960) ; R. Wieth6lter, supra note 23, at 322-38; Mohring, Die
Ausilbung des Stimmrechtes durch Kreditinstitute im Referentenwurf eines Aktiengesetzes,
in R. Hengeler, supra note 19, at 86 (1959) ; Garbers, Brsenmakler, Banken und Nominees
-Ihre Bedeutung filr die Aktionirsvertretung im nordamerischen Recht, 18 Betr.-Berater
212 (1963) ; Heinsius, supra note 226; K.lug, supra note 231; Koehler, der Referentenentwurf
eines Aktiengesetzes, 14 Juristenzeitung 73, 110 (1959); Schutz, Rationalislerung und
Recht, 16 Juris. Zeit. 105 (1961).
234. AktG Draft, explanation to § 129, at 157.
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This desire to protect corporations and banks from disturbances, rather
than to devise a more effective method of enforcing shareholder inter-
ests, may be one of the reasons why the draft proposal not only aroused
even more disturbance-creating opposition, but also would have had a
practical effect opposite to the reform's purpose as a whole.
The basic procedure which allowed banks to vote shares which had
been deposited with them was retained in the draft law." However, to
point out that these shares were not owned by the bank, the provision
permitting banks to vote such shares in their own name was eliminated.
Instead, the votes were to be cast in the name of the shareholder who
actually owned the shares, or, if that shareholder wanted to remain
anonymous, they could be voted "in the name of the one concerned." The
written instrument required to permit the exercise of the shareholder's
voting rights had to be a power of attorney that complied with the
statutory sample, rather than the former bank-drafted "authorization."
As before, the power of attorney had to designate by name the specific
bank which was to cast the votes. Unless the shareholder specifically
authorized the bank to do so, however, it was no longer permissible for
the bank to authorize another bank to vote these shares. Even if such
authorization were given, the bank having the power of attorney had to
vote the shares itself if it had an office in the locality where the share-
holders' meeting was to take place.
The power of attorney, as envisioned by the draft law, was no longer a
general authorization to the bank to vote all the shareholder's deposited
shares. It would have permitted the bank to vote at the specifically desig-
nated meeting only the shares of one corporation. Thus, the power would
have had to be renewed annually for regular meetings, and a new form
executed for any special shareholders' meetings. Most important in its
practical implications was the fact that holders of diversified portfolios
would have had to execute a power of attorney for each corporation in
which they owned shares. The formal execution of the power, however,
would not have authorized the bank to vote shares. To overcome the 1937
law's defect which put on each shareholder the burden of learning the
meeting's purpose and of instructing the bank on how to vote, the draft
required the bank to furnish the shareholder with complete information
about the meeting's agenda. This information would have had to cover
not only management and shareholder proposals, but also matters which
the bank intended to propose at the meeting. Also, the bank would have
had to inform the shareholder of how it intended to vote on each item on
the agenda. The statutorily prescribed power of attorney form would have
set aside space in which the shareholder could designate how he wanted
235. AktG Draft § 129.
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the bank to vote. Only if the shareholder had not given contrary instruc-
tions would the bank have been able to vote the shares according to its
own decision. The form would also have expressly incorporated the Civil
Code236 provision allowing the bank to deviate from the shareholder's
voting instructions if it believed that the shareholder, had he knowledge
of the particular circumstances requiring deviation, would have consented
thereto.
Obviously, the purpose of this change was to compel the furnishing
of information to shareholders so that they could specify the manner in
which their shares were to be voted. At first glance, this purpose seemed
to have been accomplished by providing that banks could not vote
deposited shares unless they had supplied the shareholder with the
required information. In this respect, the proposal resembled the fed-
erally regulated proxy system in the United States which mandated the
furnishing of information to the shareholders. However, the essential
difference which weakened the German system was that the wrong insti-
tution would have been charged with the duty of furnishing the informa-
tion. Under the German practice, the exercise of voting rights through
depositaries is a service provided by the bank for which it is compensated
by the shareholder through an ,annual fee. The institution of the new
proposal had been estimated to increase the annual fee threefold because
the procedure would have required much heavier expenditures by the
banks. As one writer stated:
[T]he extensive paper war which will necessarily result from this procedure will
cause very high costs, which the banks must shift to its customers by means of
higher deposit fees. The detailed answers and instructions would have to be carefully
registered and evaluated if the banks are to avoid unpermitted use of the powers of
attorney. This would require considerable personnel, apart from the resulting costs
for postage, printing and paper.2 37
A small shareholder who owned a few shares in several corporations,
or even in just one corporation, would undoubtedly have been reluctant
to sign the power of attorney since the costs of the voting process would
have been thereby transferred to him. The likely result, therefore,
would have been that small shareholders would not have returned the
power of attorney to the bank, and thus, would have been disenfran-
chised. Majority shareholders and management would then have had an
even freer hand in running the corporation than under the former sys-
tem.
236. BGB § 665 (C.H. Beck 1964).
237. Koehler, supra note 233, at 76.
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c. Provisions in the New Law
The legislative committees2 8 recognized the almost universal criti-
cism 239 of these proposals, and thus, partially restored the former sys-
tem in the final statute. As now enacted, 4° banks can vote deposited
shares on the basis of a written power of attorney from the owner. The
shares must be voted, however, in the owner's name or "in the name of
the one concerned," rather than in the bank's own name. As under the
former system, the power of attorney covers all the shares deposited
with the bank by that shareholder regardless of the fact that he has
diversified holdings. The new law provides that the power of attorney
is a general authorization to the bank to vote all shares at any meeting
during the time for which it is issued-fifteen months. Only the share-
holder's express authorization permits the bank to authorize someone
else to vote the shares. Such authorization cannot be utilized, however,
if the bank has an office in the locality where the meeting is taking place.
Eliminated from the statute is the provision contained in the draft
that banks may only vote shares after they have furnished complete
information to the shareholder and received his instructions on how to
vote his shares. The bank is now required to send to each depositor-
shareholder information about the meeting's agenda immediately upon
receipt of such information from the corporation..2 41 This information
must be accompanied by an indication of how the bank, considering the
shareholder's interests, thinks the shareholder's shares should be voted..
2 42
In addition, the bank must specifically ask the shareholder to send his
voting instructions to the bank. For this purpose, the statute empowers
the Ministers of Justice and Economics to prescribe a form which the
banks must use." 3 In addition, the bank must expressly inform the share-
holder that the bank's voting suggestion will be followed unless the
shareholder sends instructions to the contrary. - 4 To prevent the banks
from transferring the costs resulting from this procedure to the share-
holder, the statute empowers the Ministers of Justice and Economics to
publish regulations imposing upon the corporation the duty to reimburse
the bank for the costs resulting from the preparation and mailing of
238. Bericht des Abgeordneten Dr. Wilhelmi, Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wahlperiode,
Drucksache IV/3296, 24-25 (1962).
239. See note 233 supra.
240. AktG § 135.
241. AktG § 128(1).
242. AktG § 128(2).
243. AktG § 128(6).
244. AktG § 128(2).
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materials to the shareholders.245 Apparently, not included within this
duty of reimbursement are the bank's labor costs which result from sort-
ing and tabulating the instruction forms returned by shareholders.
By imposing these costs on the corporation, and by making the furnish-
ing of information about the agenda mandatory, the new procedure
incorporates the basic features of the American proxy system. Whether
or not shareholders will read the furnished material, make their own
decisions and communicate them to the bank is a problem which will be
as difficult to solve in Germany as it has been in the United States. This,
however, is not a legal problem, but a matter of individual shareholder
initiative. One possible legal problem which could arise under the new
statute is the extent to which detailed information must be furnished to
the shareholders. The anticipated beneficial effect of the new system
may very well not be realized if corporations and banks are allowed to
furnish information which does not give the shareholder enough knowl-
edge to decide intelligently.
d. Shareholders' Preemptive Rights
Shareholders in a German stock corporation have a statutory pre-
emptive right (Bezugsrecht)246 to purchase new shares in proportion to
their existing investment. Although this right may not be restricted in the
articles of incorporation, it can be denied or restricted with respect to a
particular issue of new shares if the resolution which authorizes the new
issue expressly provides for such denial or restriction. 247 An affirmative
vote of seventy-five percent of the capital shares voted at that meeting is
required for the approval of the restriction or denial of the right. While
such denial of preemptive rights is discretionary, it may not violate
"good morals" 248 and it may not be discriminatory, i.e., it cannot deny
the right to some shareholders but give it to others. 49 However, exclusion
of particular shareholders from the right to purchase new shares is per-
missible if it can be justified under the circumstances and is not arbi-
trary. Thus, if a shareholder is trying to get control of a corporation in
order to destroy it, it becomes management's duty to exclude him and to
see to it that only "loyal" shareholders receive new shares.50 With the
approval of the requisite number of shareholder votes, denial of the pre-
emptive right may also be permitted for valid corporate purposes, such
245. AktG § 128(6).
246. AktG § 186(1).
247. AktG § 186(3); Judgment of Sept. 16, 1927, 118 RGZ 67; Judgment of June 19,
1923, 107 RGZ 67.
248. Judgment of March 30, 1926, 113 RGZ 188.
249. Judgment of Oct. 6, 1960, 33 BGHZ 175.
250. Id. at 186.
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as the purchase of property or services which cannot otherwise be
obtained. The shares must be offered at par value unless the resolution
authorizing the increase in capital stock designates a higher price."'
In addition to shareholder authorization to increase the corporation's
capital stock, management can issue additional shares - 2 within the limits
of a prior authorization given by the shareholders' meeting. Such author-
ization is given by adding to the articles of incorporation a provision
empowering the board of managers, during a maximum period of five
years, to issue additional shares up to a certain amount. This "authorized
capital" (genehmigtes Kapital) may not exceed fifty percent of the cor-
poration's capital stock at the time the authorization is given. The pro-
vision may be renewed at the end of the five year period by amending the
articles of incorporation. Both the original authorization and subsequent
amendments require an affirmative vote of seventy-five percent of the
shares voted at the meeting. The preemptive right of shareholders applies
to these shares, but may be excluded by the articles of incorporation or
by the board of managers together with the board of supervisors. Again,
no discrimination among shareholders is permitted except where circum-
stances justify the exclusion of particular shareholders because of their
intent to injure the corporation. -53
C. The Right to be Informed About Corporate Affairs
To be informed about corporate conditions and transactions is a
necessary prerequisite to the effective exercise of shareholder rights. But
in this area, too, limits must be set to prevent injury to the corporation
resulting from the revelation of business information which might be
used by competitors. An additional danger to management's effective
functioning is also posed by the possibility that too extensive an exercise
of the shareholder's informational right may consume the unjustified
time and energy of corporate personnel.
1. American Law
Shareholders as collective owners of the corporation have a justifiable
natural curiosity in the company's general condition. This interest is
satisfied, in most cases, by imposing on management periodic reporting
requirements. Such reports must be regarded as an important share-
holder device in exerting control over managenent. Information con-
tained in reports may arouse a shareholder's interest in or suspicion about
a specific transaction. Generally, however, such information will not
251. AktG § 182(3) ; Judgment of Oct. 6, 1960, 33 BGHZ 175, 178.
252. AktG § 202.
253. Judgment of Oct. 6, 1960, 33 BHGZ 175.
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be sufficient to form the basis for decisive shareholder action. To assure
the availability of more detailed information, American shareholders are
given power to inspect corporate books and records.
a. Required Corporate Reports
Corporations listed on a national securities exchange or subject to the
mandatory registration provisions of the Securities Exchange Act are
legally required to submit annual reports to their shareholders.25 4 As a
prerequisite for listing its shares, such a requirement may also be im-
posed on the corporation by the stock exchange's internal regulations. 211
In addition, all states require the filing of annual reports, usually with
the secretary of state. The mandatory content of these reports varies
from the mere listing of corporate directors, officers and outstanding
stock,25 6 to information equivalent to that required under federal secur-
ities legislation. 257 Such reports need not be sent to shareholders,25 8 but
as a general rule, they become public documents and shareholders may
inspect them.250
b. Right to Inspect Corporate Books and Records
Shareholders also have a common law right to inspect corporate books
and records.2 60 It is a limited right, however, exercisable only at proper
times and places, and for proper purposes. It covers all corporate books
and records, including intra-corporate correspondence .2 1 Although the
English view, requiring as a prerequisite for inspection the existence of a
disputed matter or controversy, has generally been rejected in the United
States,262 courts do require that the inspection be in connection with the
exercise of a valid shareholder right.263 Thus, the inspection of books to
ascertain the company's condition before voting at a shareholders' meet-
254. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1969).
255. N.Y. Stock Exchange, Company Manual § A-4, at 64-65.
256. Del. Code Ann. fit. 8, § 502(a) (Supp. 1968).
257. ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 125-26 (rev. ed. 1969).
258. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 3006-07 (West 1955) requires the corporation to send an annual
report consisting of a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement to every shareholder
unless the bylaws expressly dispense with such report. Even where this is the case, however,
shareholders owning at least ten percent of the corporation's outstanding shares have a
right, upon request, to receive a report of the corporation's financial condition. Id. at
§ 3011. See 1 H. Ballantine & G. Sterling, California Corporation Laws §§ 266, 269 (4th ed.
1969).
259. See generally 5 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations §§ 2258-2323 (rev. ed. 1967).
260. In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103 (1899).
261. Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scheirich, 187 Ky. 423, 219 S.W. 191 (1920).
262. Id. at 428-29, 219 S.W. at 194.
263. Slay v. Polonia Publishing Co., 249 Mich. 609, 229 N.,V. 434 (1930).
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Ing or to obtain information to be used in litigation against the corpora-
tion or in a shareholder's derivative suit is a proper exercise of the right
and must be permitted.2 Moreover, the corporation's stock list must be
made available for inspection to allow a shareholder to contact other
shareholders in connection with proxy contests or matters appearing on
the corporate meeting's agenda. -0 Inspection may be justifiably denied
if it is motivated by improper purposes, such as, harassing corporate
management,260 or securing business prospects or advertising lists,2017 or
obtaining business secrets or information for a competitor. -3 Since it is
presumed that the shareholder's exercise of the right is proper, the
burden of establishing the impropriety of the shareholder's purpose rests
on the corporation.09
Almost all states have enacted statutory provisions establishing and
regulating the right to inspection of corporate books and records. These
statutes generally incorporate the substance of the rules evolved at
common law.
2. German Law
Each shareholder has the statutory right to inspect the stock ledger
which indicates the name, address, and profession of every shareholder. 0
However, since most shares in Germany are bearer shares, this is not an
important right. German law does not otherwise provide for any inspec-
tion of corporate books and records. Instead, shareholders have a statu-
tory right to obtain desired information at the shareholders' meeting. In
addition, the corporation law has provisions requiring the preparation
of annual reports which are available to shareholders.
a. The Requirement to Prepare Reports
During the first three months of the corporation's business year, the
board of managers must prepare the annual financial report, consisting
of a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement 27 Although in the past
the itemized figures in these reports have not necessarily reflected the
corporation's true financial condition, the revision of the dividend
declaration provisions will hopefully result in the preparation of more
reliable financial reports.
264. 5 W. Fletcher, supra note 259, at §§ 2223, 2225.
265. See ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 31 (rev. ed. 1969).
266. See Sawers v. American Phenolic Corp., 404 Ill. 440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1949).
267. Eaton v. Manter, 114 Me. 259, 95 A. 948 (1915).
268. Dines v. Harris, 88 Colo. 22, 291 P. 1024 (1930).
269. Slay v. Polonia Publishing Co., 249 ifich. 609, 612, 229 N.W. 434, 435 (1930); H.
Henn, supra note 102, at § 201.
270. AktG §§ 67(1)(5).
271. AktG § 148.
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In addition, the board of managers must also prepare an annual
business report (Gesckdftsbericht) which is submitted with the financial
report to the auditors for examination.2 2 The business report is sub-
sequently transmitted to the board of supervisors which must examine
it and make a written report about the business report's conclusions.213
Then the financial, business, auditor's and supervisor's reports are all
submitted to the shareholders' meeting. Upon conclusion of the meeting,
the financial report must be published in the official government publica-
tion Bundesanzeiger.2 7 4 All the reports, accompanied by a notice of such
publication, must subsequently be submitted to the local court which
keeps the official Commercial Register.275 Copies of the submitted reports
must be made and given to anyone who asks for them, provided his re-
quest is based on "justifiable interest." Interpretation of the statutory
language supports the conclusion that every shareholder has such an
interest because of his investment, and that the motive for which he seeks
the information is not a valid ground for refusing his demand for infor-
mation.276
The business report's content is prescribed by statuteY.2 7 It must
describe both the corporation's general activities during the preceding
year and its present condition. It must also explain the financial report,
with special emphasis on the methods used to determine the value of
assets and liabilities. Any substantial differences between the new and
the preceding financial report must be explained. Furthermore, the
relationship between the corporation and its subsidiaries must be re-
vealed. Compensation paid to managers and supervisors must be spe-
cified, including salary, bonuses, and all fringe benefits. In addition to
these specific items, the report must give an account of all important
corporate matters in order to satisfy the overriding mandate that it be
a Cconscientious and trustworthy accounting." Violation of this standard,
either through false statements or through the omission of material
matters, may result in criminal liability involving a fine, imprisonment of
up to three years, or both. -78
272. Id.
273. AktG § 171.
274. AktG §§ 25, 177(2).
275. AktG § 177(1). The local Amtsgericht, nominally a state court of first instance
whose jurisdiction and procedure are nevertheless regulated by federal law, keeps the
Commercial Register and acts as Registergericht. HGB § 8 (C.H. Beck 1964); Gesetz tiber
die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit § 215, Law of May 17, 1898, [18981
RGBI. I 189, as amended [hereinafter cited as FGG]. See also Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer,
Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1194-99 (1958).
276. HGB § 9 (C.H. Beck 1964). See 7 H. Wiirdinger, Handelsgesetzbuch, Kommentar
§ 9, Anm. 2, 3 (2d ed. 1953).
277. AktG § 160.
278. AktG § 400.
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b. The Shareholder's Right to Obtain Information
at the Annual Meeting
Every shareholder, regardless of the size of his investment, has a
statutory right to ask for information at the shareholders' meeting7°
The right extends to all matters reasonably connected with topics under
discussion at the meeting. For example, in connection with the annual
resolution exonerating management, all corporate transactions and man-
agement decisions of the previous year come within the scope of this
right. 8° Specifically made the subject of proper inquiry are relations
between the corporation and any "connected enterprise." This encom-
passes not only subsidiaries but also contractually associated com-
panies.2 ' Members of the board of managers who conduct the meeting
must answer "fully and truthfully" all questions which fall into this
proper sphere.
In addition, the statute specifies an exhaustive list of reasons that
justify a denial of requested information. The most important of these is
the right to withhold information which, according to "reasonable busi-
ness judgment," would cause "not inconsiderable damage to the associa-
tion or to a connected enterprise .... "212 This wording reflects an
important change, both substantively and remedially, from the 1937
statute. Under that statute, the denial of information because of possible
injury to the corporation was left to management's "discretion.11"2 3 Criti-
cism of this discretionary power used to be answered by pointing out
that a denial of requested information was judicially reviewable. This
argument disregarded the limited scope of such judicial review, however,
and ignored the fact that, as a practical matter, "judicial review is not a
sufficient assurance that the Board of Managers is not acting arbitrar-
ily.";2 4 As in American law, German law limits judicial review of a dis-
cretionary act to the issue of abuse of that discretion. The court has no
power, therefore, to enforce its own view of the correctness of the action
taken. Thus, German courts asked to overrule a refusal to disclose in-
formation were not permitted to balance shareholder against corporate
interests to determine which ought to prevail under the particular cir-
cumstances of the case. A further procedural difficulty was that the
shareholder, as plaintiff, had the burden of proving a violation of his
279. AktG § 131(1).
280. See A. Baumbach & A. Hueck, Aktiengesetz, Kommentar § 131, Anm. H1(4) (13th
ed. 1968); R. Godin & H. Wifihelmi, supra note 64, at § 112, Anm. 3.
281. See Reinicke, Das Auskunftsrechts des Aktion-rs, in R. Hengeler, supra note 19, at
117, 126-27.
282. AktG § 131(3).
283. AktG § 112 (1937). For an exhaustive study of the shareholder's right to informa-
tion under this section, see H. Scheu, Das Auskunftsrecht des Aktion-rs (1959).
284. H. Scheu, supra note 283, at 51.
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right to information, whereas management needed only to explain its
reasons for refusing the disclosure. Management, of course, was not
required to explain why the information would injure the corporation,
since that would necessarily have resulted in the revelation of the in-
formation.285 The judge was thus made to consider the question of abuse
without any evidence, except in the rare case where the shareholder
could substantiate allegations of illegal motivation on management's
part. Even if the shareholder were successful in his suit, the practical
benefit of his victory was questionable. The right to ask for information
could only be exercised at the corporate meeting. It did not extend to
obtaining written or oral replies to questions at any other time. Con-
sequently, a refusal at one meeting to answer a question which was re-
versed by the court only entitled the shareholder to receive an answer at
the following shareholders' meeting.
To eliminate the board of manager's power to act as "judge in its own
case,) 286 the new statute includes a test of reasonable business judgment.
The expectation is that the court will now need to inquire into the factual
circumstances to determine whether the refusal to disclose information
to the shareholders is legally justifiable. Thus, "judicial review is not
limited to a determination of whether the board of managers abused its
discretion, but is directed towards determining whether the board of
managers must reveal the information.1217 It is questionable, however,
whether this change can alleviate the difficulty facing the court in decid-
ing whether possible corporate injury is outweighed by resulting share-
holder benefit. This balancing cannot be done except by forcing the
board of managers to reveal the information which allegedly will injure
the corporation. To prevent such injury, the new statute2 8 provides that
the "Law Pertaining to Non-Contentious Litigation"289 applies to
such a proceeding. This statutory procedure excludes the public from
court actions.290 While use of the revealed information by third
persons, therefore, is prevented, this device does not keep the information
285. A. Baumbach & A. Hueck, Aktiengesetz, Kommentar § 112, Anm. 4 (12th ed. 1965);
R. Godin & H. Wilhelmi, supra note 64, at § 112, Anm. 7.
286. AktG Draft, explanation to § 125, at 154.
287. Id. See also Gierke, supra note 23; Wernicke, Die Auskunftsverwcigerung Im
Referentenentwurf elnes Aktiengesetzes, 14 Betr.-Berater 99 (1959), for a discussion of the
1958 draft proposals.
288. AktG § 132(3).
289. FGG. For table of amendments, see F. Keidel, Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit, Kommentar
§ 41-42 (8th ed. 1963). This special procedure applies mostly to matters involving personal
status, guardianship proceedings, inheritance and property divisions. It is more flexible
than regular court procedure. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 275, at 1196.
290. FGG § 8. F. Keidel, supra note 289, at § 8, Vorb. 7.
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from the complaining plaintiff who has a constitutional right9' to attend
court proceedings when the opposing party presents its evidence. - 2 Even
if the court should determine that the board of managers were justified
in its original denial of the information request, the shareholder would
have discovered what he is now not supposed to know. Under these
circumstances, the new provision that a judgment in favor of the share-
holder entities him to immediate access to the information, rather than
requiring him to wait until the next meeting, is really, as a practical
matter, superfluous. The new statute, therefore, has brought greater
protection to the shareholder, but has failed to retain sufficient protec-
tion for the valid corporate interest of keeping business information
secret. Only where the denial of the information request was unjustified
can the new procedure be regarded as fulfilling its purpose.
The new statute293 lists specific subject matter about which no infor-
mation need be given. For example, details about corporate taxes need not
be presented beyond those contained in the financial report. And, since
the formation of hidden reserves is now more closely regulated by other
statutory provisions, requests for more detailed information than given in
the financial report may also be denied. These provisions attempt to
prevent unnecessary delays in the progress of the shareholders' meeting.
Another ground justifying a refusal to divulge information is the possi-
bility that the managers would thereby subject themselves to criminal
liability. Significantly, the draft's explanatory text -94 refers not to the
protection of management, but to the necessary protection of "state
secrets," the revelation of which results in criminal liability. The statute,
therefore, does not intend to classify the denial of information as justi-
fiable because revelation may self-incriminate the managers and result
in their criminal liability for wrongful conduct.
The statute expressly provides that an information request may not
be denied for any reason other than the ones specified. It is doubtful,
however, whether this provision will be literally enforced. The 1937
statute had a similar provision to which courts and legal writers de-
veloped two exceptions. These will undoubtedly continue to be enforced.
The first results from the application of Civil Code § 22 6,2" which pro-
291. Grundgesetz art. 103 (1966) (W. Ger.).
292. judgment of Oct. 25, 1956, 6 BVerfG 12.
293. AktG § 131(3).
294. AktG Draft, explanation to § 125, at 155.
295. BGB § 266 (C.EL Beck 1964) states that: "The exercise of a right which can only
have the purpose of causing injury to another is unlawful." The concept that possession
of a legal right imposes duties upon the possessor in exercising it is especially strong in
German law. Under the principle "qui lure suo utitur neminem Iaedit" the exercise of a
legal right must take into consideration its impact on other persons' interests and on society
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hibits the "misuse" of legal rights. Because of this statute, the board of
managers has been allowed to refuse information on the grounds that the
shareholder was simply trying to harass management or was pur-
suing "exclusively selfish interests."2 19 The second exception provides
that since the shareholder's right may only be exercised at the meeting,
an answer may be refused because the papers or documents needed to
give the information are not presently available and can only be obtained
with "excessive expense. ' 29 7 However, notice to the board of managers
before the meeting that certain information will be requested may
obligate it to have the necessary books and records on hand.98
c. The Appointment of Special Auditors
A special procedure involving the disclosure of information is available
to minority shareholders. Specifically, the shareholders' meeting has the
statutory right to appoint special auditors to investigate a particular
matter or transaction.299 Under this provision, therefore, an individual
shareholder can request the shareholders' meeting to appoint auditors.
Of course, this request may not be voted upon by the board members
whose conduct is to be investigated. Nevertheless, if the shareholder's
request is denied, resort to legal process in the form of a petition to
court for the judicial appointment of auditors 00 can be had if certain
prerequisites are met. For example, this petition must be granted if
brought by shareholders owning ten percent of the corporation's capital
stock or whose stock has a par value of two million marks. These share-
holders must be able to show, however, "justified suspicion" that the
particular transaction was fraught with dishonesty or constituted a gross
violation of the law or the corporation's articles of incorporation. More-
over, the conduct to be investigated must have occurred in connection
with the incorporation or within the last five years. While the petition is
pending, the complaining shareholders must deposit their shares with the
court after showing that they owned the shares at least three months
before the date of the meeting at which their request for the appointment
of auditors was denied.
as a whole. See H. Mitteis, Deutsches Privatrecht 28-29 (3d ed. 1959). In French law, the
doctrine of "abus des droits" serves a similar function. See R. Schlesinger, Comparative Law
372-76 (2d ed. 1959).
296. judgment of June 12, 1941, 167 RGZ 151.
297. Id. at 169.
298. R. Godin & H. Wilhelmi, supra note 64, at § 112, Anm. 2.
299. AktG § 142(1). This provision does not authorize the appointment of auditors to
investigate management conduct in general. Judgment of Jan. 22, 1935, 146 RGZ 385.




This inquiry into the legal status and rights of German shareholders
commenced with the assertion that assurance of shareholder as well as
corporate interest required a compromise. The legal framework designed
to protect these inherently conflicting spheres of interest must balance
them in order to arrive at a solution which is fair to both, while taking
into consideration the impact of the legal norms on society.
This weighing and balancing has been done more realistically and more
efficiently in the United States than in Germany. The factors responsible
for this are not to be credited solely to greater American ingenuity or
even better understanding of the problem. American corporation law has
benefited greatly from the flexibility of the legal system of which it is a
part. Common law and statutory damage remedies provide for compen-
satory relief for wrongful conduct, while the equitable injunction prevents
its occurrence. Where these approaches have proven inadequate, com-
prehensive governmental regulation and control have intervened to
protect investors. German corporation law is much more rigid. Generally,
only remedial relief is available, and even that is circumscribed by pro-
cedural and financial burdens which the small shareholder usually cannot
sustain.301 While the new German corporation statute has eliminated some
of these obstacles, too many remain. Thus, as long as corporations almost
exclusively issue bearer shares and a minimum share interest remains a
prerequisite to the availability of relief, the small shareholder of a large
corporation virtually has been denied a remedy because he has no means
of contacting other small shareholders to solicit their support. Another
factor which renders the enforcement of management's responsibility
more difficult is that the corporate organ empowered to formulate policy
and to transact business is responsible only to a weak supervisory board,
and does not have to account directly to the shareholders for its conduct.
In one sense, German corporation law is paradoxical. It shows great
concern for the employer-employee relationship, as the mandatory repre-
sentation of workers on the board of supervisors demonstrates. Yet, the
law's traditional conservatism with respect to shareholder rights remains
largely unabated. The shareholder is still regarded as a "saver" who
should be satisfied with receiving interest payments, and not as an in-
vestor to whom management owes an accounting for its conduct.
The reform of legal norms which are based on historical tradition can-
not be accomplished overnight. Recognition of the inadequacy of the
301. The subject of procedural remedies and their obstacles in German corporation law
is too complex to be treated in this article. The author is presently preparing a separate
article on this topic.
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rules is a prerequisite to change. While the new German corporation
statute retains provisions which do not adequately protect the rights of
small shareholders, continued economic expansion in Germany and other
Common Market countries can be expected to demonstrate these in-
adequacies and the need for further reform.
